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Co-Publishers
Department of Political Science
Alexander Dubček University Trenčín
Študentská 2, 911 50 Trenčín, Slovakia

Centre for analysis of administrative-political processes and institutions (CAAPPI)
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of social sciences
Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia

Alma Mater Europaea - European Center Maribor (AMEU-ECM)
Gosposka ulica 1, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia

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GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES TO AN AGEING SOCIETY – LOCAL ROLE IN MULTILEVEL PROCESSES

Cristina BARBOSA, Paulo FEIO, Ana FERNANDES and Mats THORSLUND

Demographic ageing marks strategic orientations and public policies. It's a challenge to societies, public and private institutions and Welfare State. The goal of this study is to understand the local governance strategies to an ageing population and the role of the local in multilevel governance processes. A qualitative methodology it was followed that supports analysis and understanding of both local ageing policies. The samples are case studies of two contexts, Portugal and Sweden, respectively city councils of Lisbon and Nacka, where stakeholders were interviewed. Different concepts and visions influence local ageing policies. Vertical coordination is easier to follow in Portugal, but without concrete laws, and in Sweden, horizontal coordination is emphasized between providers and municipalities. Local public intervention in ageing seeks renewed actions and this study allows to conclude that a perfect local policy doesn’t exist. However in many aspects, can be complementary.

Key words: local policies; public policy; governance.

1 INTRODUCTION

Some authors consider ageing of the world population, a progressive and rapid phenomenon with unprecedented implications in societies of all countries (United Nations Population Fund and HelpAge International 2012). Harper (2010, 178) argues that population ageing is not a new phenomenon, but its pace of change and worldwide amplitude are growing rapidly. Cravey and Mitra (2011, 306) presents that all around the world, older populations are increasing and from 1950 to 1998, the world population over age 60 grew 255 million. By the year 2025, that number is expected to be 1.3 billion; the majority, 839

1 Cristina BARBOSA, UNIFAI – Institute for the Biomedical Sciences Abel Salazar, Porto University and ISCTE, University Institute of Lisbon, contact: cristinamobarbosa@gmail.com. Paulo FEIO, University Institute of Lisbon, contact: aireosafeio@gmail.com. Ana FERNANDES, CESNOVA - Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities (New University of Lisbon), contact: ana.alexandre@iscsp.ulisboa.pt. Mats THORSLUND, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm University, contact: mats.thorslund@ki.se.
million, will reside in developing countries and at least 500 million will reside in developed countries.

A gender difference is also a specific characteristic to take into account, because women tend to live longer than men, with the result that there are older women worldwide than older men. In 2012, for every 100 women over age 60, there were 84 men, and this tendency creates so called feminization of ageing, particularly the relatively large proportion of the “oldest old” who are women and this have important implications for policy (United Nations Population Fund and HelpAge International 2012).

Population ageing marks the contemporary society, imposing new conceptualisation, practices, and personal and social views. Despite the disparity in political orientations and policy models, strategies for ageing are characterized by innovative and challenging forms of action among the various layers of expertise, specifically with regard to the level of local expertise. In this framework, local governments and local and regional actors emerge as key players in capitalizing opportunities for active ageing and to promote solidarity between generations. For Age Platform Europe (2011), these actors are the only ones able to understand and respond to the specific challenges of demographic ageing to communities.

The aim of this article is to analyze which are the local governance roles and practice strategies to an ageing population and to understand which could be the role of the local institutions and stakeholders in multilevel governance processes. The specific aims are to understand the new paradigms of ageing public policies; to understand and to analyze the State intervention in ageing field; to discuss and to analyze ageing local governance in Portugal and Sweden, respectively, in Lisbon and Nacka municipalities and to project future trends and innovative practices and policies in ageing field as well as which methodologies can be used to foster ageing local innovation. The empirical focuses are local policies in Portugal and Sweden, especially in Lisbon and Nacka municipalities.

1.1 A new concept of local governance

The new paradigm of regional policies states that the performance of a region depends largely on its capacity to exploit and mobilize its own assets and resources, and this determines the extent to which the region contributes to national performance (OECD 2011). For OECD (2011) and Barca (2009), the old regional policies were based on temporarily compensations for location disadvantages of lagging region. This approach has progressively been replaced by new models that consider that there are an underutilized potential in all regions, and all territories have positive contributes to national growth. Therefore, regions empowerment should be encouraged as a key element for enhancing regional competitiveness and national cohesion.

According to those approaches, the importance of place-based policies is emphasized, instead of global, a-spatial and non-differentiated or space-blind policies. For Barca (2009), place-based development policies have a strong connection to local and territories where they are applied, respecting the place-specificity of natural and institutional resources, individual preferences and knowledge. The role played by the material and immaterial linkages between places and the resulting need for policy interventions has to be tailored to concrete places, creating a multidimensional perspective of regions.
In OECD (2005) view, local public services are an essential feature of the attractiveness of the territories, and local level must have a strong and active voice in the multilevel governance framework, overcoming the central power tendency to simply distribute grants and setting standards. Local collective depends to a large extent on local inputs such as its ability to set up institutional networks which facilitates coordination among local actors and with regional and central governments and hence encouraging diversity in the partnerships of local projects and the involvement of the private sector. Horizontal networks of public, private, and non-profit organizations are the new structures of governance, as opposed to hierarchical organizational decision making (Bingha, Nabatchi and O’Leary 2005, 547). Leaders in public affairs identify tools and instruments for the new governance through vertical networks of public, private and non-profit organizations.

In a study about governance for OECD, Rodrigo, Allio and Andres-Amo (2009) suggested that decentralization is a process that has had important consequences for the way that different government levels produces and enforces new forms of regulation and this is an element of the process of multi-level governance, which encompasses devolving powers and responsibilities across all levels of government.

According to the United Nations Development Programme (2009), governance is related to the processes by which public policy decisions are made and implemented. It is the result of interactions, relationships and networks among different sectors (government, public sector, private sector and civil society) and involves decisions, negotiation, and different power relations between stakeholders. According Bingham, Nabatchi and O’Leary (2005, 548), the concept of governance has been explored in many academic fields, including political science, public administration, policy making, planning, and sociology. Although Bingham, Nabatchi and O’Leary (2005, 548) referred that both share goal-oriented activities, governance and government are not synonymous terms. Government occurs when those with legally and formally derived authority and policing power execute and implement activities; governance refers to the creation, execution, and implementation of activities backed by the shared goals of citizens and organizations, who may or may not have formal authority and policing power.

Complementary, as Stubbs (2005, 66) emphasizes, multi-level governance is the opportunity to foster and develop a deeper understanding of the complementarily of a range of theoretical and empirical models, to explore the innovation and challenging perspectives and allows for an understanding of complexity at and between levels. According to Giddens (2007) and Beck (in Gonçalves 2011) the new power relations between local, regional, central and transnational level explicit a multi-level governance strategies, and this is a priority for OCDE (Rodrigo, Allio and Andres-Amo 2009).

At local level context, social actors are urged to adopt a new local governance structures supported on the interface between government and civil society, based on solidarity and horizontal collective decision accountability, strengthening the legitimacy of the political system through the rational use of available resources (Gonçalves 2011). The governance of new public policies focused on the societal challenges, must associate citizens in decision making, to avoid central state government, have partnerships, new institutional actors, consultative councils, local commissions and develop interfaces between private and public sectors (ibid.).
1.2 Ageing, Public Policies and Governance

For Naue and Kroll (2010, 2), the discourse on ageing is predicated upon a dichotomy between active/healthy/normal ageing versus non-healthy/non-normal ageing.

Recognizing the need to call world-wide attention to the serious problems besetting a growing portion of the world populations, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to convene a World Assembly on Ageing in 1982, in Vienna. The purpose of the World Assembly would be to provide a forum to launch an international action program aimed at guaranteeing economic and social security to older persons, as well as opportunities to contribute to national development (United Nations 1983). The Plan of Action was considered an integral component of the major international, regional and national strategies and programs where formulated in response to important world problems and needs. Its primary aim was to strengthen the capacities of countries to deal effectively with the ageing of their populations and with the special concerns and needs of their elderly and to promote an appropriate international response to the issues of ageing through action for the establishment of the new international economic order and increased international technical co-operation, particularly among the developing countries.

In 2002 a Second World Assembly on Ageing was held in Madrid. The Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing and the Political Declaration were adopted, as a new agenda for handling the issue of ageing in the 21st century (United Nations 2002). Madrid Plan of Action has three priority directions: older persons and development, that advocates integration of ageing in development; advancing health and well-being into old age, that deals with quality of life for older persons; enabling and supportive environments, that sets the requirements of the environment to promote individual development into older age (United Nations 2006). Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing was designed to guide policy formulations and implementation, and thus providing a broad framework for monitoring, review and appraisal activities. It differs from the Vienna Plan as it formulates a new plan of action to address the social, cultural, economic and demographic realities of the twenty-first century, according special consideration to the needs of developing countries (United Nations 2006). In a complementary field, World Health Organization (2002) defines active ageing as the process of optimizing opportunities for health, participation and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age. It allows people to realize their potential for physical, social, and mental well-being throughout the life course and to participate in society according to their needs, desires and capacities, while providing them with adequate protection, security and care when they require assistance.

For European Commission (2014), active ageing means helping people to stay in charge of their own lives for as long as possible as they age and, where possible, to contribute to the economy and society.

Related to active ageing concept, Almeida (2007, 20) considers that it has been used in different contexts and often in a more restricted definition than World Health Organization definition. According to the same author, World Health Organization definition reflects a concept with multiples determinants while
others restrict the active ageing concept exclusively related to physical activity or productive activities.

Walker (2008, 88) defends an effective strategy in the context of active ageing, and this must be based on the logic of partnership between citizens and society, and working in partnership, in which the State should keep a role of enabler or facilitator, mobilizing and motivating citizens. In Andor (2012) opinion, a real involvement of public authorities at various levels is needed, different stakeholders across different policy areas are compelled to work together on designing effective and comprehensive strategies for active and healthy ageing.

Currently, the emphasis is on active/healthy/normal ageing, something that, in Naue and Kroll (2010, 2) opinion, will not be politically sustainable in an increasingly ageing society with a growing number of persons with long-term conditions, dementia and/or disabilities. The economic sustainability can also be used as an argument to question policies and practices for elderly (Naue and Kroll 2010, 2).

In the final remarks of the Conference on Good Governance for Active and Healthy Ageing, Testori concludes that ageing is a cross-cutting issue that must be dealt far beyond the boundaries of one policy area or one sector and commitment and action from all partners at all levels, both public and private, are necessary, working in a sustained and collaborative way. Furthermore, active involvement of ageing population and financial alignment are key ingredients to build up good governance for active and healthy ageing.

Demographic ageing is a current phenomenon that marks the speeches, the strategic and policy direction. It’s a challenge to societies and institutions in general, in particular to the current models of collective organization and the Welfare State. The role of older people in contemporary societies and their status as persons and as a heterogeneous group is evolving, forcing the reconfiguration of personal or societal concepts and practices. There are great disparities between countries in ageing policies and strategies. New and innovative models of governance can be built on new work processes between government levels.

2 DESIGN AND METHODS

According the Active Ageing Index (2013), that includes indicators illustrating different domains such as the level to which older people live independent lives, the participation in paid employment and social activities as well as their capacity to actively age, Sweden is in the top of the ranking across EU Member States while Portugal is at the fifteenth position. The two selected case studies - Portugal and Sweden – are, therefore, contrasting ones. This study selected a Mediterranean and Northern European country mainly to know how these two countries, with different welfare states define and implement ageing public policies and make a local governance of public policies. Furthermore, Sweden is actually one of the most ageing countries and Portugal have future perspectives of being also one of the most ageing country in Europe.

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2 See concluding remarks speech at Conference on good governance for active and healthy ageing, 4 June, Brussels.
The samples are case studies of two contexts, Portugal and Sweden, respectively city councils of Lisbon and Nacka, where stakeholders were interviewed. Lisbon is part of the case study by being one of the more aged regions of Portugal and also because Lisbon Municipality have a Municipal Gerontological Plan – a local policy in ageing field, since 2009. On the other hand, Nacka municipality was chosen because in 2007 in Peer Review: Freedom of choice and dignity for the elderly (specialists meeting organized by European Union in 2007 in Stockholm), Nacka was presented as a best practice of Swedish local policies for older people.

The Guidelines for review and appraisal of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (United Nations 2006) advocates a participatory approach, in which different stakeholders should be involved, namely from the civil society, the private sector, the academic institutions and governmental agencies. For the purpose of this study stakeholders with direct and indirect intervention in ageing public policies were identified. The following stakeholders were selected in both contexts to participate in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Portugal entity</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Sweden entity</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local politician</td>
<td>Lisbon Municipality</td>
<td>Politician_PT</td>
<td>Nacka Municipality</td>
<td>Politician_SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal professional</td>
<td>Lisbon Municipality</td>
<td>Professional_PT</td>
<td>Nacka Municipality</td>
<td>Professional_SW K Professional_SW_H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior person</td>
<td>Inválidos do Comércio, Lisbon</td>
<td>Senior_PT</td>
<td>Ektop, Nacka</td>
<td>Senior_SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National strategic organization</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Office of Ministry of Solidarity, Employment and Social Security</td>
<td>National strategic organization_PT</td>
<td>National Board of Health and Welfare</td>
<td>National strategic organization_SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Professor</td>
<td>CESNOVA – Universidade Nova de Lisboa</td>
<td>Academic Professor_PT</td>
<td>Ageing Research Center - Karolinska Institutet / Stockholm University</td>
<td>Academic Professor_SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Associação RH 50+ , Lisbon</td>
<td>Company_PT</td>
<td>Danvilethom, Nacka</td>
<td>Company_SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third sector entity</td>
<td>Inválidos do Comércio, Lisbon</td>
<td>Entity_PT</td>
<td>Seniorcenter Ektorp, Nacka</td>
<td>Entity_SW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following Flick (2005), a qualitative methodology was adopted considering that analyzing and understanding actuation models, consists on work based on opinions, thinking’s and personal considerations that came from interviewed participants and also because qualitative methodology allows social relations study. Data collection was based on individual and structured interviews to 7 stakeholders identified in each country. An informed consent was also made, signed by all stakeholders interviewed in this study. In Portugal, interviews were held from the 20th of March till the 26th of April 2013 and in Sweden from the 16th to the 24th of April 2013. Interviews were recorded with an audio device, because in Flick’s (2005) opinion it allows interviews transcription to be more accurate without having researchers self-perspectives. All transcribed interviews were forwarded to each stakeholders, and afterward asked their opinion about the transcription. For data analysis NVivo was used; this is software for qualitative research that helps collection, organization and analysis of interviews, focus group or audio data (QSR International 2013).
3 RESULTS

3.1 The conceptual framework in ageing polices

The aim of this topic is to understand which theoretical approaches influence ageing policies and to analyze which are the visions and conceptual baselines about ageing and older people, in interviews contents.

In general both contexts are according with activity theory (25 references) and continuity theory (24 references). Disengaged theory has an insignificant reference, as presented in Figure 1. Attending Figure 1, Portugal has more references about Activity Theory than Sweden, which has more references in Continuity Theory. In both countries Activity and Continuity theories are the most referenced theories and these results can predict that national and local policies for ageing are inspired by Activity theory and Continuity theory, respectively, in Portugal and Sweden.

**Figure 1: Number of ageing theories references, by context**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity Theory</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Theory</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disengagement Theory</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: Number of references by types of target populations, by contexts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advantaged</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contenders</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviants</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Schneider and Ingram (in Hudson and Gonyea 2012, 273) studied social constructions and political power of different target populations. The fourfold typology it was applied at the interviewers contents and also analyzed the vision about power and social construction of older people.

The results demonstrate that in Portugal the ageing population is identified majority like Advantaged target (n=19) and it’s the same in Sweden (n=10). An analysis to Figure 2 allows to conclude that in Sweden target of Contenders represents the second target, while in Portugal is Dependents and Contenders target. The target Deviants (n=10) in Portugal occurs because the majority of the interviewed stakeholders still report that, in a recent past in Portugal, older people are looked as deviants. The Figure 2 presents the fourfold typology of target populations organized by Schneider and Ingram (ibid., 273), with analysis of stakeholders contents interviews.

**Table 2: Fourfold typology of ageing, by Schneider e Ingram (in Hudson and Gonyea 2012, 273)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>ADVANCED</td>
<td>CONTENDERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>It is essential that wisdom and bring senior and bring ... and operationalize active ageing (Politician_PT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Should we see elderly persons as a specific group in the general population... and be this kind of special law that regulates care of elderly, health care for example (Academic Professor SW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>DEPENDENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>From the standpoint of what we did in social security (…) is still very much a curative and remedial perspective, and honestly I do not think we jump on it ...(National strategic organization_PT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>I mean it’s twenty, almost 20% of population and a lot of them... all are not disabled but the larger extent of this are disable in one way or another, a lot of people are cognitive impair ...(National strategic organization_SWA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Is currently trying to create a war until the political level between generations, saying that these generations are consuming everything and that we are consuming resources that future generations will not have ...(Entity_PT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>The system that we have in Sweden today it means that the main bulk or care of the elderly and health care is public financed with tax money (Academic Professor SW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.1.1 Portugal and Sweden: vertical coordination in ageing policies

Central level in Portugal has just national laws that describes municipalities competences. At ageing field, has responsibilities on: social equipments investments, building mainly day care centres and nursing homes, present public data and reports about new investments on social programs and projects and interventions promotion on social exclusion and poverty: local very dependent on central financial terms should do a reflection about other resources (...) other funding sources (National strategic organization_PT). In Swedish context, it was found that central level produced abstract laws, that are questionable, and it’s done a follow up of municipality’s actuation at this field. In spite of this, they have a positive discrimination for poor municipalities, because these municipalities should have the same opportunities and resources as all the others. This policy allows that municipalities can be scored and this is public information. Central state organized formal councils of older people and with this new guidelines are defined.

At regional level, Portugal doesn’t have a formal regional level constituted, because is very poorly worked in the metropolitan area of Lisbon, in my view, that is perhaps because we have no policy, no upgrades (Politician_PT) and in
ageing theme, is not so much the regional level ... Clearly, clearly local ... and more and more ... because the central state is an abstraction and is missing the real problems (Academic Professor_PT). In Sweden case, regional level has a coordination with local level at ageing field: With the local primary help care mainly aim the hospital, mainly the geriatric clinics, we have a cooperation with then (Professional_SW_H).

At local level Portugal hasn’t got guidelines or models and priority areas for action, is not a coordinated between the various levels of governance of the country and of course has a slower that we could have (…) we do not have a orientation line, systematic, organized enough (National strategic organization_PT) and [the central should] then give freedom to local authorities to be able to get where you want (Politician_PT). In spite of this, we can identify that in Portugal both levels follow international guidelines about theoretical concepts of ageing, including the WHO and the EU, in opposition to Sweden.

In Portugal, municipalities develop different models of intervention, and it’s not usual municipalities develop a local policy on ageing like Lisbon, because at local level we already do much, but if there was a policy, as there are municipal policies, (…) but even coming from central government policies more accurate... (Professional_PT). In Portuguese professor’s opinion, when the policies are directed to older people, always seems to be the same and that all people belongs to a homogeneous category, static, and when are older, just only jumped, jumped into other side (Academic Professor_PT), while in Swedish context, professional are according that we want to look it as the whole municipality, that we have done for the elderly, we have divide it in to three groups. The elderly that are in the special hosing, they are most of the time the most wonderful as well... there are the elderly that have home care, and then there are the elderly that don’t have anything at hall. They’re just elderly but fine. (Professional_SW_K).

In Sweden, central level has a very abstract law about local powers and this allows each municipality to implement different policies, if those are in favour of population (older people also) needs. The local policies on ageing is based on national orientations because Central level is policy making, legislation (both in health and social services), follow up... there are what is call to (…) checking out the results, (…) if they are following the national regulations. (National strategic organization_SW). This articulation stimulates autonomy and freedom of action by local authorities about their better methodologies to develop national guidelines - Local level (…) have the responsibilities for home help services, nursing care in private homes and also long term care, and also they have responsibilities for housing, education, technical infrastructures,(...) there are a lot of responsibilities on local level. (National strategic organization_SW); and there are a lot of things that can be done locally, because it cannot be regulated by politicians on a national level. (Academic Professor_SW). Municipalities are generally entities that guarantee the quality of services of providers, private and public sector, and assess satisfaction levels of citizens (the municipalities are supposed to support people in need, including elderly persons, what constitutes the need is never defined - Academic Professor_SW). Nacka doesn’t has formally a policy or planning to ageing (The (…) strategy is a healthy ageing and prevention and promotions as well - Professional_SW_K) but from the analysis of stakeholders interviews, they follow the same ideology about local action: the importance of all providers must guarantee the freedom of choice, dignity and health ageing on local level (Several strategies, (…) one of the strategies is the consumers choice, the choice of choosing what, who is giving you the services that you need, and this means that, you have the possibility to...you
have a strength to vote, tell you what you want and power over the services given - Professional_SW_H).

3.1.2 Portugal and Sweden: horizontal coordination with stakeholders of ageing policies

The analysis of stakeholders interviews, allows knowing different action methodologies in both contexts about local governance in multilevel processes and with stakeholders. Portugal tries to involve older people in decision making processes, but at local and national level, there is a poor formal citizen participation in political decision, neither the organizations nor the elect or technicians also have this practice of developing a lot with people, but increasingly will happen (National strategic organization_PT). This relationship is achieved with questionnaires for the elderly as a method of diagnosis and advisory councils (often dependents from local public power). Sweden presents as a national strategy Freedom of choice and the central and local levels have elderly people councils with active and independent power we have a municipal elderly council, and they are very active (...) because their voice is stronger... (Politician_SW).

The relationship between private sector and local power raises some doubts in the Portuguese case, still denoting it has difficulty in involving private providers and have some doubts about the presence of pressure groups on the economy [about the importance of private sector involvement] I don’t see so very important (Professional_PT). In Swedish context it’s a new experience because by tradition, the private hasn't been there, and they growing last decade and growing very fast... by and by we have a number that also have to take them, to include private organizations in discussions, seminars, commissions. (National strategic organization_SW). The proximity, the neutral tract of local power providers, the requirement for the fulfilment of quality and certification requirements appear to be focal points for the proper functioning of this articulation.

The third and private sector articulation in Portugal, is presented only with sample projects, verifying the incipient practice at this level, but the expression that will be important I think we should bring from the Nordic experiences these jobs, because that is a very high intelligence between the public and private (Politician_PT). In Sweden, it is of great importance the opportunity of sharing and dialogue between competing sectors and latent competitiveness between them Completion, but we cooperate sometimes... (Entity_SW).

In Lisbon, at third sector, it was stated a certain distance and disconnection between local authorities and third sector, focusing the action with the parish council as not been a great connection in recent years, at least with us or our institution (Entity_PT). The third sector considered themselves with "financial health", not showing the need to revise and innovate their methods of operation. The Swedish case develops an internal strategy to compete with the private sector, embracing the environment as a competitive asset. Portugal and Sweden have unanimous opinion about the need of third sector be open to external partnerships, build strategies for coordinating with the private sector and public and present themselves more proactive.

The role of Universities and innovation centres in both contexts underlines the importance of policies evaluation and the contribution that universities and researcher’s can provide to local authorities. Sweden stakeholders referred that politicians do not want to policy investigations, but only reviews: We don’t have
local research, so all the big municipalities, have one or several small research units that are supposed to assess what is happening (...) the municipalities are specially interested in having their actions and their running services seriously evaluated... is not a demand for research. The demand is to legitimize the political decisions that are made (Academic Professor_SW). Lisbon refers openness and receptivity to have cooperation protocols with universities and innovation centres, while Nacka prefers to have more than one research centre cooperation for data analyses and reports. In Lisbon, there was a protocol with the ageing observatory of the University of Lisbon, not only to monitor but also to gerontologic plan (...) Only monitoring, are not making regular assessments, we are trying to negotiate to do so ... (Politician_PT).

The Figure 3 presents a schematic view of the results about vertical and horizontal coordination between stakeholders and governance levels, in both contexts, Portugal and Sweden.

**Figure 3: Schematic View of the Results about Vertical and Horizontal Coordination, in Portugal and Sweden**

Source: Barbosa (2013).

4 Discussion

Ageing and public policies have different models of acting, stakeholders involvement and strategic domains in Portugal and Sweden, and respectively, in Lisbon and Nacka. Public administration in both contexts are structured by three levels: local, regional and central, although in Sweden the competences of each one are well defined and in Portugal, specifically regional level have less specifically ageing competences attributed.

Local authorities, in Portugal and Sweden, have different levels of decentralization and institutional guidelines about methodologies to ensure ageing challenges and promoting ageing policies. The vertical coordination between three levels and also their competences and models of acting in ageing
field, in Portugal are based from central to local level, without specific guidelines of how should be ageing intervention and local authorities goals, and without follow up of local intervention done by central level. Regional level has just public services on health and social security and doesn’t have intermediated role between top and down levels. In Swedish context, central level has abstract laws, without detailed goals, and those can be interpreted in different ways by local authorities, causing different local policies and public investments. In spite of this, central level follow up ageing interventions of local level, and develop abstract laws that local level must follow and implement in the way that they considerer adjusted to the community, but in Trydegard and Thorslund (2010, 498) opinion, in the field of elder care, this control is rather weak. About the autonomy of local level, in the study of Trydegard and Thorslund (ibid., 496) is referred that Sweden has a decentralized universalism, but there is a potential tension between two main social policy principles: universalism and local autonomy and the welfare policy based on an universalistic nature, is highly responsibility of local authorities and creates a “welfare municipalities”.

At the horizontal coordination, Portugal doesn’t include private companies in stakeholders meetings and governance processes. In spite of this, Portugal (central level) base their social protection on the private non-profit sector and central level pays direct by non-profit entities the services that older people need and doesn’t pay to the private, however older people can choose between private or non-profit entities. Sweden creates a competitive rating between services of non-profit and private, and also this rating assess municipality services for older people and creates a competition between Swedish municipalities and local providers. Central level finances directly providers and older people have freedom for choice on which provider they want.

About communication models, Portuguese municipalities have implemented the Social Networks Program, a program where municipalities lead and based on accountability and mobilization of the whole society in order to eradicate poverty and social exclusion. This program allows that different local stakeholders (parishes; non-profit entities; regional public services; associations) can be part of the local decisions and stimulates their communication, participation and competences. In Sweden, some stakeholders interviewed agree that further communication between stakeholders, specifically, between providers and municipalities.

In both contexts, local level has actually to handle different challenges when comparing to central and regional levels. Local level is the level of proximity to community voices and public services that works to satisfy population needs. Local level must handle regional disparities between municipalities and in Portugal at ageing policies field; there is no positive discrimination to the poorest municipalities. Sweden has extra financial support to the poor municipalities, which allows creating more regional equality for poor regions, so they can compete with the rich ones.

The design of local public policies has distinct visions and concepts about ageing as stated by Osswald (2013), ageing is characterized by heterogeneity and the need to recognize the false stereotype of the elderly as diminished, in need, sick and unproductive, social and economically. The results of this study follows this vision of ageing as a normal lifecycle process, and heterogeneously experienced by individuals. For Hudson (2010) ageing should evolve towards building positive political age, as this study concludes, to find other means of action for persons over 65 years. This is further corroborated by the opinion of
some stakeholders about the importance of coordinated actions of several existing policies and measures and the construction of a holistic policy of an ageing society.

In globalization era, local governance models should seek to know, understand and interact with the strategic guidelines of international and national level, should participate as partners and / or develop the necessary local capacity.

The local level governance models seem to be guided by principles of cooperation, coordination, listening and engagement of stakeholders. These principles should be constituted as a basis for cooperation between the different levels and between intervention areas of political power, with the active and formal involvement of the older people, by the construction of governance platforms based on actions and principles that emancipated the vertical and horizontal coordination policies and that they are able to promote as a more positive committed and socially active ageing.

5 CONCLUSION

Currently, local level has some challenges to handle: regional disparities between local authorities and by that promoting the same opportunities and services to citizens and few resources and financial shortages to have new arrangements to promote policies. Ageing populations are one of the biggest challenges for local level, because of the need to promote health and social support and also develop integrated policies to a heterogeneous group. The results of this study allow to conclude that local public policies have different social concepts and older people are a heterogeneous group.

Portugal has a governance model based more on vertical coordination; horizontal coordination has insufficient complementarities across sectors. Each level (central, regional and local) doesn't have functions and articulation models clearly defined. About ageing policies, the lack of articulation is more evidenced, mainly in local level. Swedish ageing local public policies demands quality on social and health services, promotion of ageing in place and dignity. Programs or services about social inclusion and cohesion, culture and intergenerational proximity don't have a common promotion. The actuation focus of local level in Sweden is about quality standards regulation and promoting competitive edge between services and providers, as opposed to Portuguese local level.

Local level is the proximity level of the citizens, territories and social challenges. To face those, local governance should be based on top-down laws or guidelines that better define the roles of the three levels for satisfaction of ageing and older people needs. Local level can be central, promoting articulation directly to top down, with public administration levels and services and international orientations. On the other hand, local level has strong inputs for the horizontal level, with parishes, universities or other innovation centres, citizens (individuals) and councils of citizens (groups) and providers (nonprofits and private companies). All stakeholders together can emerge a network and build a strong ageing policy, along with family policies. The handle of those vertical and horizontal dynamics and implementation of multi-level governance methodologies, are crucial to territories, actors, providers and public administration to face population-ageing growth.
In future studies related to this theme, it's important to follow methodologies based on research-action that have empirical data to complete theoretical researches. In spite of this, mapping and study design thinking of local action in ageing, is another research theme, with new methodologies of social innovation on ageing study and new services and policies to encourage a new paradigm of ageing.

REFERENCES


ROLE OF OPPOSITION IN CONTEMPORARY PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES – THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

Drago ZAJC

While the role of institutionalized parliamentary opposition in legislative and wider political processes is most important for the quality of parliamentary democracy, opposition has been inadequately researched and the actual behaviour of opposition in a particular country or a set of countries has not been properly explained. Traditional functions of parliamentary opposition – to propose, oppose, expose and depose have been in highly politicized circumstances in post-Socialist countries frequently intended to block the government's proposals and to delegitimize coalitional government. The paper presents the particular model of government-opposition relation in Slovenia where opposition was using constitutionally designed means of control, being at the same time over equipped with possibility to demand a referendum on matters which have been decided in the parliament what made the legislative process controversial and futile. After the change of constitution in 2013 the opposition has had to change its strategies and adopt a more cooperative attitude.

Key words: opposition; traditional functions; parliamentary means of control; extra-parliamentary means of direct democracy; model of government-opposition relations.

1 INTRODUCTION

Political opposition is an essential feature of modern democracy and of contemporary parliamentary systems. According to Robert Dahl political opposition with legally existing political parties is not only modern, but also one of the greatest social discoveries (Dahl 1969, 17). As von Beyme noted in 1973 opposition can develop only in a constitutional state where decisions are taken on the basis of majority vote and certain rights are granted to the members of representative bodies (Beyme 1973, 157). Without a working opposition, there is neither political democracy nor rational management in a modern state. Though there are only few studies of the repositioning of the opposition and

1 Drago ZAJC, PhD, is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Contact: drago.zajc@fdv.uni-lj.si.
there is no systematic analysis of the powers of opposition in advanced democracies (Helms 2004, 25).

The concept of opposition has been particularly useful for the explanation of the dramatic changes, which have taken place in a number of countries in East Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of democratization and transition. While the events in 1989 and 1990 in East Central European countries have been interpreted in various and often contradicting ways, the basic explanation lays actually in the fundamental repositioning of the opposition – the critical and dissident elements of social forces transformed themselves into important political players changing positions from outside or periphery of political system to the centre of political decision making (Lewis 1997, 614). It proved that opposition couldn’t be connected with hate and destruction but considered as means for peaceful solving of political conflicts including the conflicts with the replacement of political elites. The repositioning of opposition means also alternation between government and opposition.

2 CAPACITY OF NEW OPPOSITIONS IN THE ECE COUNTRIES

The new post-socialist oppositions in ECE countries found themselves in a political situation characterized by institutional fluidity, relatively weak parliaments with dominant executives, and unstable party systems (Kopecky and Spirova 2008, 136). Though inexperienced, the new post-socialist oppositions in ECE countries had to adapt to the new standards of effective parliamentary oppositions and to take over particular traditional functions (Bibič 1993, 67). By performing these functions they helped to consolidate and deepen democracy. The first function of opposition has been from the very beginning to criticize the government by pointing to its weaknesses and failings and to present sound arguments contributing to the rationality of political debate. Performing this function altogether with the second - providing alternatives to government’s plans and proposals is considered to be in the best interest of the citizens. The third important function of the new oppositions has been transforming hidden and marginalized issues into foci of political interest taking in account that the gate-keepers of political system do not allow all the interests to be equally represented (Offe 1985, 99). Even more important function of an opposition is to control the executive whether it is operating within the legal and legitimate limits. In the modern parliamentary systems there are several means of control, which have to be cautiously used like parliamentary questions, interpellations and (no)confidence motions. By performing these functions strategically every opposition increases its visibility and legitimation in the public, proving at the same time its operational capacity to take over the government’s responsibility during the electoral term or on new parliamentary elections. Winning the next elections is the primary goal of every opposition (Glazer 2007, 2), while minimizing the incumbents chances to be re-elected. However, opposition does not necessarily adopt a negative stance towards the government and may develop also a constructive approach (Norton 2008, 240).

Performing these traditional functions has been a difficult job for new post-socialist oppositions, which were frequently week, fragmented and unstable in comparison with most of the oppositions in Western countries (Bibič 1993, 72). Various deficiencies in the realization of their functions have strongly influenced their practical and strategic behaviour. Political parties in opposition have frequently felt to be undesired, brought into discredit (Lukšić 1990, 23) or
unjustly deprived of the means of real influence. They considered themselves to be marginalized in the sense of being left without due information about government's intentions and excluded from the decision-making since the government's majority in the parliament could easily outvote the opposition. Sometimes they considered themselves to be manipulated by the strong parties in coalition or by the networks of the 'old boys' of the former system limiting their chances to compete on the next elections. Their behaviour was frequently inconsistent and varied from cooperation and passive resistance to active obstruction of the government. While previous research in Western European countries shows surprisingly high level of cooperation between the government and opposition and the dominant pattern of behaviour is consensus seeking (Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006, 86), the consensus and cooperation between opposition and government in ECE countries seem to be almost exceptional, while the model of competitiveness prevail. These are the countries where basic disagreements exist over some ideological issues and even over some basic rules of political game.

Taking in consideration great challenges in front of the new parliaments, overburdened with the issues and problems and dealt by inexperienced political actors in the parliamentary arena - coalition and opposition, one might suppose that cooperative style of behaviour and consensus voting cannot be achieved easily and might be influenced by particular internal and external factors.

According to Franco Cazzola (1974, 17) and Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006, 96) these behavioural variations are depending on particular factors like institutional context and the electoral system with particular effects on the stability of a coalitional government. The electoral system and fragmentation of political parties might be recognized as an 'Achilles heel' of any model of political opposition. The electoral system determines the number of political parties and the way of forming the majority in the parliament while the opposition might be composed of a number of parties with similar or even different political programs. The second factor is the institutional context determining the mode of the incorporation of opposition within the system - how and where in the parliamentary structure the opposition is involved and what kind of veto powers actually has in its hands against the government. The third factor is the nature of party system and ideological positions of political parties on the left-right axis (Sartory 1976, 113). If these positions are predominantly ideological and the distances are strictly observed the parties will lack the potential of consensus building. One of the typical components of such discussion is 'personalization of conflicts' (Olson 1997, 120). The fourth factor is the predominant political culture determining the way of political participation. If political culture is tending towards authoritarian model of leadership the participation might be constrained or even replaced by populist means of direct democracy simplifying political issues and limiting real options. These factors help to explain the behaviour of opposition from 1989 on in comparison with the oppositions in the countries of East Central Europe or of their West-European counterparts (Lewis 1997, 628). The variety of these factors is determining also the capacity of opposition to function parallel or consecutively on various instances or levels – in the parliament, within the civil society, through media, etc.

In this paper we will try to answer three elementary questions - the first is how important is the development of constitutional opposition for the democratization of formerly socialist country and consolidation of democracy. The second question is which are the main factors and other conditions like
historical legacies which have been determining the relation between opposition and coalition in Slovenia and what has been the role of opposition in Slovenia in the period before and after the accession to EU. And the third question is how efficiently has the opposition used the main parliamentary means of control over the government altogether with the extra-parliamentary means.

3 PATTERNS OF OPPOSITIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN SLOVENIA 1990–2014

In our study of oppositional behavioural patterns in Slovenia we will take into consideration some already existing statistical and other research data on the transition of Slovenia revealing the legalization and institutionalization of opposition after 1989 (Jambrek 1992, 93) when an amendment to the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia of 1974 was passed by the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia allowing for the first time after the 2nd WW free political organization. A number of newly formed political parties under the label of DEMOS were later incorporated into the structure of the new freely elected Assembly in April 1990 altogether with the renewed parties of the former system and the later for the first time after the second WW acquired its own internal opposition (Bučar 1990, 3). However, the role of opposition in this preliminary period was conceived as primarily constructive and loyal to the government what was close to the two party model, which had little relevance for the new Slovene multiparty system.

The final institutionalization of parliamentary opposition was made by the new Constitution of Slovenia of 1991, the Law on the Deputies of 1992 and the new Standing Orders in 1992 (renewed in 2002). We will present some ways and levels of competition between the opposition and the government in six consecutive legislative terms and try to determine the factors, which explain the oppositional behaviour and its variations starting from the fact that the proportional electoral system with 4% threshold has been almost regularly allowing seven parties to enter the National Assembly. To the difference of other ECE countries where the number of parties has been radically declining every year, Slovenia still has a rather fragmented or dispersed party system (Olson and Ilonszki 2011, 238). The parliamentary opposition has been therefore regularly composed of several even quite different parties, while a number of parties with rather similar programs constituted the coalition government. Majority of parliamentary parties, including the Democratic Party

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2 Based on such concepts a 'shadow government' was formed in 1990 by the new opposition Party of Democratic Renewal (SDP), without chances to take over the government (Lukšič 1993, 155).

3 The National Assembly (Državni zbor) consisting of 90 deputies (88 elected from party lists and two representatives of national minorities) is the main chamber of two chamber national parliament established by the Constitution of 1991. The second chamber – National Council (Državni svet) is representing functional and territorial interests having no direct influence on the legislative process in the National Assembly. According to its prerogatives it may veto a bill passed in the National Assembly, propose a new bill, or demand an investigation in the matters of public importance.

4 Among the right-wing and centre-right wing parties are Slovene Democratic Party (SDS), Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) which disappeared in 2014, the New Slovenia (NSi) and Slovene National Party (NSI) which disappeared in 2011. Among the centre-left and left parties have been Liberal Democracy (LDS) which disappeared in 2011, Zares, which disappeared in 2011, Party of Slovene Pensioners (DeSUS), Civic List (DL) which disappeared in 2014, the Social Democrats (SD), Positive Slovenia (PS), which disappeared in 2014, Alliance of A. Bratušek (ZaAB), Party of Modern Centre (SMC) and the United Left (ZL).
of the Slovene Pensioners (DeSUS), were willing to enter coalitions or to join opposition regardless of their strength. Only the right-wing Slovene Democratic Party (SDS), due to its perception of politics, has taken a strong opposition attitude if it was not able to have the leading position in the coalition government.

### TABLE 1: TYPES OF COALITIONS AND OPPOSITIONS IN SLOVENIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1990–2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Term</th>
<th>Type of Government Coalition</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
<th>Type of Opposition</th>
<th>No. of Parties in Opposition</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1992*</td>
<td>Demos</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>left-wing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1996</td>
<td>'mixed'</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>'mixed'</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>left-wing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>'mixed'</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>left-wing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>left-wing</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan 2012–27. Feb 2013**</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>left-wing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Feb. 2013–5. May 2014***</td>
<td>left-wing</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The transitional National Assembly composed of three chambers – freely elected in April 1990 and dissolved after the first elections to the new National Assembly in December 1992.
**The first part of the mandate ended by the constructive no-confidence vote.
***Second part of the mandate ended by the resignation of the Prime Minister.

We will analyse the behaviour of parliamentary opposition as it has been demonstrated in various ways and forms - by consensual or adversarial voting and by the use of various parliamentary means of control over the government – parliamentary questions, interpellation and constructive vote of no-confidence. Finally we will investigate also the use of extra-parliamentary devices like the means of direct democracy.

#### 3.1 Voting and voting cohesion

As much as the voting for and against the government proposed bills in the parliament is important part of the behaviour of opposition, the cohesion voting in the modern parliaments is considered to be the best indicator of the cooperative behaviour. Taking in consideration previous models of oppositional behaviour it depends to a great extent on the level of inclusiveness of opposition into the parliamentary structure and procedure (Helms 2004, 30) where members of opposition have particular rights and duties.

Opposition parties in parliamentary systems with proportional electoral systems are usually highly involved in the decision-making. Though the legislative initiative has been mostly with the government, the opposition parties in the Slovene National Assembly have certain co-governing powers since they are included in the agenda setting process taking place in the advisory body to the Speaker (Kolegij) and in the standing committees, enjoying even certain priorities (leadership of certain supervisory committees). Like in the other post-communist parliaments in the ECE countries political parties are proportionally included in the standing committees with deliberative working style and assigned a proportion of the chairmen positions in these committees (Mansfeldova 2011, 141). The distribution of these positions has been sometimes a matter of institutional conflict (Khmelko 2011, 209). The whole committee structure and composition of the committees undoubtedly favour consensual pattern of government-opposition relation rather than adversarial
style of behaviour of both actors. It is in the committees where the opposition can present its opinions and disagreements on the topical or 'ad hoc' policy choices presented by coalitional government or even negotiate with the coalition majority. By delaying the process in different stages or threatening with the use of other devices like demanding the Constitutional Court to rule over the constitutionality of the passed bill, the opposition in the National Assembly may force the government to make concessions and come to consensual solutions. It may also put pressure on the government to accept its positions by using its veto power since any change of constitution or change of particular bills on electoral system etc. and Standing Orders (renewed in 2002) requires a two-third majority. A significant number of decisions could have resulted from such negotiations and deals. Though such consensual working pattern which could promote co-operational behaviour and lead to the consensus voting has been hardly realized in practice.

The data on the voting in the Slovene National Assembly show that the consensual voting does not meet the level of consensual voting in other parliaments. Comparative data collected in the parliaments of Germany, Great Britain and Italy show surprisingly developed cooperation between opposition and government and in some parliamentary terms high level of consensual voting (Rose 1980, 80). In German Bundestag a unanimous decision-making style was even discovered and only about ten per cent of legislation was a matter of different voting (Saalfeld 1990, 77). Similar patterns of cooperative behaviour have been discovered lately in the Spanish parliament (Mujica and Sanchez 2006, 87). A similar analysis in the U. S. A. Congress on the roll-call voting on 742 most important pieces of legislation from 1967-2004 showed that the index of cohesion voting at the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s was around 33 per cent, while in the early 2000s it more than doubled (Theriault 2005).

In order to establish the level of cohesion voting in the Slovene National Assembly we may use the data on the roll call voting of the deputies in the period of 1994-2008. For their analysis the agreement index (AI) was applied measuring the level of agreement of the deputies between the values 0 – total disagreement or no-cohesion and 1 - total cohesion (Hix et al. 2005, 216). Our analysis of voting patterns showed some important changes in time - the cohesion was actually low before the 1997 and augmented after when Slovenia’s process of joining the EU was intensified and the political parties signed ‘Agreement on the Cooperation in the Process of Joining the EU’ demanding high level of consensual behaviour. The deputies were voting strategically in the common interest, which did not contradict the interest of the parties (the only exception was the Slovene National Party - SNS). Cohesion voting diminished again after 2004 when the strategic goals of the country were achieved by entering the EU and NATO. At the same time we can explain the return to low level of cohesion and an increase of oppositional voting also by the fact that defeated parties of the left centre demonstrated openly their dissent with the right-wing winners leaving little room for negotiations and

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5 The data were gathered within the first parliamentary research of cohesion voting in the Slovene National Assembly taking the record of 10.512 votings (Deželan et al. 2009, 29).
6 The index was calculated according to the formula taking into account Y (number of deputies inside the National Assembly voting for) and N (number of deputies voting against).
7 In this period some most important acts were adopted in the Slovene National Assembly - the Pre-accession strategy, the Constitutional Law on the change of Art. 68 of Slovene constitution allowing the foreigners to purchase land property, Government’s Strategy of Joining the EU etc. The intensive process of harmonization of Slovene legislation with the EU legal system from 1999 to 2002 also demanded high level of political consensus and voting cohesion.
search for pragmatic solutions. It is evident that the influence of European integration process on the oppositional behaviour was not long lived and the patterns of political competitiveness and antagonism reappeared, diminishing again the voting cohesion. The oppositional voting increased in spite of the new agreement 'Partnership for development' signed in 2006 by some left- and right-wing political parties. The experiences with the integration did not make the qualitative change of the political norms and behaviour (Deželan et al. 2009, 35). Voting cohesion has not increased as was expected even in the 2008 when Slovenia was presiding the EU showing that the deputies in opposition considered presidency as a government’s project. Though we lack exact data for the period after 2008 elections we may suppose that the behaviour of political parties in National Assembly after these elections and especially after 2011 and 2014 early elections has not changed and the cohesion voting might even be lower (a new research of cohesion voting has not yet started). Though there are also surprising examples of cohesion voting because of the impact of economic crisis on the strategies of political party groups.

3.2 The Use of the Parliamentary Means of Control over Government

Besides the active participation in the legislative process and voting the opposition in post-socialist countries can challenge the work of the government also by using different means of control. Constitutionally designed means of control like questions, interpellations and confidence votes represent special opportunities for every opposition to demonstrate its strength vis-a-vis the government and its capacity to secure its continuous responsiveness or even to take over the governmental position.

Among various means of control the parliamentary questions have become a regular way of communication of opposition with the government in the parliaments of democratic countries. Though they are primarily the means by which parliamentary opposition is demonstrating its legitimate existence and importance in the democratic process. Parliamentary questions which are constantly addressed to individual ministers and the government may be very differently motivated (Rasch 1992, 14). An increase of parliamentary questions in Western European Parliaments is a common reaction to the growing powers of the executive. In East Central European parliaments (Hungarian, Czech, Polish, Slovene or Croatian) it is also a demonstration of the growing critical potential of these parliaments. Parliamentary questions are not only intended to allow the criticism of opposition to be openly expressed, they may also be pointing to the issues and dilemmas which were disregarded by government in the preparatory stages of some bills or appeared during their implementation (Norton 1993, 112). They are even most appropriate means for promotion of opposition since the work of oppositional deputies in standing committees is mostly hidden from the eyes of the public. The governments in post-socialist countries seem to be even more sensitive to oppositional question and sometimes even want to overtake them (Zajc 2004, 218). As some preliminary research in Slovenia shows critical question of opposition contribute to the more responsible and accountable work of the ministers and of entire governments. If a minister cannot explain its activity or certain action in a credible and trustworthy way, his position may be endangered also from the inside of the coalitional government.

The growth of parliamentary questions in the Slovene National Assembly in the period 1992-2014 demonstrates the relative increase of the capacity of opposition in the Slovene National Assembly to establish efficient control over
the government. Opposition was strategically using questions in order to obtain information over government's activity, trying at the same time to expose some inconsistencies in the policy implementation or mistakes of responsible ministries and members of cabinet. A small number of questions were addressed to the government and responsible ministers by the deputies belonging to the majority parties in order to promote government's policies.

**TABLE 2: NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS IN THE SLOVENE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY LEGISLATIVE TERM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative term</th>
<th>Number of All Parliamentary Questions</th>
<th>Questions asked by Opposition</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-1996</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>2,459</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>3,144</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>3,148</td>
<td>2,346</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data not available

A careful examination of the content of the parliamentary questions also reveals main confrontation line between the opposition and coalitional government and exposes a number of evident conflicts on particular policy fields where both sides have taken entirely adversarial and uncompromising positions. Only minority of questions put by opposition parties actually had an effect on the practical directions of the government or the activity of a minister or helped to solve some problem in a consensual manner. What we could count as an evident gain from the regular question time was an open exposure of most important political and other issues, which the coalition government disregarded have been brought to public attention and served as means of political mobilization of the voters.

To the difference of parliamentary questions, *interpellations* are determined by constitution as means of control over individual members of government or the whole government, which may lead to a sanction. Parliamentary interpellations are variously determined by constitutions, so comparisons are difficult. The real effects of interpellations in contemporary parliaments are not necessarily in the resignation of a minister or government, but in a critical debate on the particular important issues. Since the number of deputies necessary for initiating an interpellation is relatively low (the Slovene Constitution in the article 118. stipulates that at least 10 deputies may initiate an interpellation), the opposition may use it even if it is weak and small in number. As in other transitional countries the coalition governments in Slovenia have been in all cases with few exceptions unified and sufficiently strong to support the ministers and vote down the interpellation. In the past 6 terms of National Assembly there 36 interpellations were initiated against individual ministers or against the government of RS.
Interpellations in the Slovene National Assembly were initiated by oppositional party groups or various groups of oppositional deputies. Only two interpellations against individual ministers were successful and the ministers were forced to resign (Minister for foreign affairs Z. Thaler in 1996 and Minister for internal affairs M. Bandelj in 1999). Three ministers resigned after the interpellation was introduced and before the final voting. Six of the introduced interpellations were not put on the agenda because the term has expired. Initiating an interpellation has in the past years also become more demanding for opposition and it did not want to take chances and blame itself since the public opinion was reacting negatively to precipitated interpellations, which led to excessive accusations and unproductive quarrelling. It is therefore not surprising that the number of interpellations dropped after 2000 when coalitional governments became stronger and internally more cohesive. A new rise of interpellations initiated in the sixth (2012–2014) mandate may be attributed to the effects of economic crisis which opened new conflicts between the left- and right-wing parties regarding the social functions of the state etc.\(^8\)

\(^8\) In the first 1992-2006 term eleven interpellations were introduced - against Minister for Justice (Miha Kozinc), Minister for finances (Mitja Gaspari), Minister for education and sport (Slavko Gaber), Minister for culture (Sergi Pelih), Minister for environment (Pavle Gantar), Minister for defense (Jelko Kacin), Minister for justice (Meta Zapandic), Minister for economic activities (Maks Tajnjak), Minister for foreign affairs (Zoran Thaler), Minister for health (Bozidar Volje) and against the Government of RS.

In the second 1996-2000 term there were seven interpellations introduced - against the Government of RS and against Minister for defense (Aloiz Krapez), Minister for education and sport (Slavko Gaber), Minister for internal affairs (Mirko Bandelj), Minister for Agriculture (Ciril Smerkolj), Minister for finances (Mitja Gaspari) and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Aloiz Peterle).

In the third 2000-2004 term there were four interpellations introduced - against Minister for environment (Janez Kopač), Minister for internal affairs (Rado Bohinc), Minister for health (Dušan Keber) and against the Government of RS.

In the fourth 2004-2008 term there were three interpellations introduced - against Minister for culture (Vasko Simoniti), Minister for public health (Andrej Bručan) and Minister for internal affairs (Dragutin Mate).

In the fifth 2008-2011 term there were four interpellations introduced - against Minister for education (Igor Lukšič), Minister for agriculture forestry and food (Milan Pogačnik) and two interpellations against Minister for internal affairs (Katarina Kresal).

The sixth 2012-2014 term may be divided on two parts – after the first early elections at the end of 2011 the right wing coalition government under the leadership of J. Janša was established, while the left-wing opposition introduced in 2012 two interpellation against the minister for Internal Affairs Vinko Gorenak and Minister for High education and Science Žiga Turk. When Alenka Bratušek was elected for new Prime Minister by constructive no-confidence motion on 27. February 2013 and new left-wing government was established, the right-wing opposition introduced five interpellations – against Minister for finances Uroš Cufer, Minister for infrastructure Samo Omerzel, Minister for public administration dr. Grega Virant (twice) and against Minister for education dr. Jernej Pikalo.
The vote of confidence is a particular means of opposition designed in modern constitutions for challenging the government. At the same time it may be used also by the government for testing the unity of the partner parties. In some ECE countries the opposition has excessively used this instrument but unsuccessfully (Kopecki and Spirova 2008, 149). In practice the confidence vote proved to be efficient means for strengthening the discipline among the partner parties at the time of the passing the bills which were met with objections within coalitional government. The motion of confidence has been a practical device used by governments in several countries. Though the confidence vote does not necessarily help the coalition government to continue its term since opposition may vote it down being helped by some defecting parties or groups of MPs.

The simple vote of confidence determined by the Slovene constitution (Art. 117) may actually be introduced only by the Prime Minister binding the confidence vote either to the passing of a particular proposal of the bill or to the proposal of the candidates for new ministers replacing the ministers belonging to the parties deserting coalition. Such attempts to strengthen the unity of the coalition partners were opportunities for opposition to vote against the government’s proposal with intention to overthrow the government. In the period 1992–2014 the confidence vote was introduced four times. In 2000 the first confidence motion introduced by the Prime Minister dr. J. Drnovšek was voted down and the opposition turning into majority with only a few additional votes later elected new Prime Minister. The second time it was introduced in 2007 by Prime Minister J. Janša, binding it to the preparations of the Slovene Presidency of the EU. In 2011 the confidence motion introduced by Prime Minister B. Pahor was voted down, National Assembly was dissolved and new elections were called. The fourth time the confidence motion was introduced on 14th November 2013 by Prime Minister A. Bratušek, when she bound the vote to the passing of the 2014 budget and new law on taxation of property.

Opposition has only rarely used the constructive no-confidence vote, determined by the Slovene constitution (Art. 116) according to the German example (similar system of binding confidence vote on government to the proposal of possible successor to the Prime Minister is known also in Spain and Israel). The first constructive no-confidence motion after the independence of Slovenia was introduced in spring 1992 in the transitional National Assembly (a few months after the modern constitution was adopted in December 1991) by the liberal and mostly left-wing parties. In the third attempt the candidate for new Prime minister dr. J. Drnovšek was elected and the former government led by A. Peterle was dismissed. The constructive no-confidence motion was introduced again on 27. February 2013, when the right-wing coalition was dissolved and A. Bratušek was elected for new Prime Minister, replacing J. Janša.

An additional important means by which the opposition can exercise control over the government is parliamentary investigation. Taking the opportunity to launch an investigation the opposition exercises the right of every parliament to be fully informed about any matter dealt by the executive. Though the right to initiate an investigative committee can be used also by the parties of coalition

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9 The Czech government lost vote of confidence midway through the Czech presidency of the EU and the remaining time of presidency was administered by a care taker government (Špicarová, Stašková and Mansfeldova, 2009: 87). In the recent time it was frequently used by Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister in the former Italian government in order to secure sufficient votes among coalition composed of a number of different parties for passing the government’s bills in the two chamber parliament.
government it is the opposition which is mostly interested to control the actions of the government when dealing with the matters of particular importance and to investigate the political responsibility public officers.

The right of the National Assembly to launch an investigation is determined in the Slovene constitution (Art. 93) and by the law on parliamentary inquiry, adopted in 1993. There were sixteen committees of inquiry established in different mandates in the period 2000-2014, ten of them on the initiative of opposition parties or groups of MPs belonging to these parties. Six investigations were introduced by coalition parties or groups of MPs, some intended to deal with the responsibility of the former government. While the establishment of the committees of inquiry attracted great deal of parliamentary and public attention, a number of committees have not finished their work or prepared the report before the end of particular mandate for various reasons (demanding and time-consuming work, lack of specialized legal knowledge etc. The results of parliamentary inquiries introduced by opposition or coalition parties neither impacted seriously the relations of power between the coalitions and oppositions nor the prospects of particular parties on the next elections.

3.3 The use of extra-parliamentary means - calls for referendum

Besides the possibilities to participate in the parliamentary legislative process and large opportunities to use constitutionally designed means for controlling the government, opposition rarely has opportunity to challenge the policies of the government by using extra-parliamentary devices like referendum. Such instruments are not recognized as genuine devices of political opposition nor they can be found in countries where the emphasis is on the representative democracy. The use of referendum is excluded in the political systems with parliament-centred opposition with no veto and/or co-governing devices for minority parties (United Kingdom) or in the systems with strong co-governing devices and parliament-centeredness of institutional means of political opposition (Germany). The use of abrogative referendum worked in Italy as a catalyst of the regime change (Helms 2004, 54). Optional referendum is considered as an exceptional device and not as a complementary means to the legislative decision-making. Frequent calls for referendum in the cases when a decision was already taken in a parliament would contribute to the misuse of the means of direct democracy and harm the authority of the parliament. Even in the countries of ECE where such constitutional arrangements exist (Hungary, Bulgaria) they are quite restrictive and the opposition is not able to use them (Kopecky and Spirova 2008, 153). A particular exception is Switzerland where referendum is driving force of gradual co-optation of the major opposition parties into oversized coalition government (Helms 2004, 48).

Opposition in Slovenia was one of the rare oppositions, which could with no particular restrictions resort to the instruments of direct democracy incorporated in the Slovene democratic model. Constitutional regulation of direct democracy in Slovenia was determined in the 1991 Slovene Constitution in a very broad way. According to the Constitution (Article 90) National Assembly could call a referendum on any issue, which was the subject of regulation by statute. A referendum could be called on its own initiative, but

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10 According to the experiences of the country with long time practice of referenda, referendum is considered as an important strategic device to achieve certain policy goals for opposition and also coalition parties. Negotiations between the opposition and the government may be carried on until a compromise is reached or a referendum may be called.
obligatorily if it was demanded by no less than one-third of all the deputies, the National Council or by no less than 40,000 voters. Referendum was more specifically regulated by the Law on Referendum and People’s Initiative adopted in 1994 (amended in 2005) determining that voters may on a referendum decide in advance on particular matter to be regulated by law or decide about the law already passed. No quotas of voters were needed for validation of referendum. If National Assembly considered that a demand for a referendum was not in compliance with constitution it could demand the Constitutional Court to decide upon.

Referendum proved to be an important and frequently used instrument of direct democracy from 1996 on when the first referendum on the electoral system took place. There were altogether 19 referendums until 2013. Their number increased after 2000 when the left-wing coalitional government won amazing majority and the right-wing opposition was reduced to one-third of the deputies. A surprising drop of referendums in the fourth legislative term (2005–2008) was a consequence of the small capacity of left-wing parties, finding themselves for the first time in opposition, to mobilize voters against the new measures of financial austerity brought by right-wing coalition government and of the growing disagreements on the strategies of opposition in the new situation.

The number of referendums increased again during the fifth legislative term (2008–2011) when the right-wing opposition took again an extremely uncooperative attitude combined with attempts to undermine by all means the legitimacy of coalition government. Opposition had several times used other actors like different civic organizations and voters to bring forward the formal demand for a referendum and supported certain issues from behind. The differences in the number of referendums between the electoral terms demonstrate that they have become an important device of right-wing opposition in the period overburdened by the economic crisis.

While the referendums called in previous legislative terms served mainly for rallying the supporters of opposition and had no particular effect on the stability of government, the referendums in the legislative term 2008–2011 had not only aggravated the problems brought by the economic problems but have destabilized the whole political system. In 2011 the right-wing opposition supported referendums on two most important bills regulating the job market and pension system. The new left wing coalitional government established after the 2008 elections attempted to cope with the crisis and to modernize part of the job market aiming to achieve greater transparency and stimulation of students to finish their studies in due time (the actual regulation allowed for the students to compete on the job market). The new Bill on the ‘Small Work’ was passed in the National Assembly on October 26th, 2010 with sufficient majority of the coalitional deputies while all the deputies of oppositional parties voted against. The veto introduced by the National Council was rejected on the second voting in National Assembly on November 11th. Soon after the demand for a referendum on the bill was introduced by the Union of the Free Trade Unions and student organizations supported by opposition. On the referendum taking place on 10. April 2011 almost 80 per cent of the voters voted against (the turnout was 33.9 per cent).
The second Bill on the Pension Reform was bringing a complete reform of the system endangered from the demographic developments and effects of economic crisis. It was passed in the National Assembly on December 14, 2010 with the votes of most of coalition deputies and against the votes of opposition. A week later the National Council vetoed the bill, but the National Assembly immediately rejected the veto and confirmed the bill. In the politically most delicate circumstances oppositional parties did not take the risk to call a referendum but gave again their undivided support to the initiative of the Union of Free Trade Unions to collect the 40,000 signatures of the voters. After the signatures were collected and the ruling of Constitutional Court that the referendum on the pension bill would not be unconstitutional, the referendum was finally called and the bill was rejected on 5. June 2011 (the turn-out was 40.4 per cent).

The rejection of both bills - the bill regulating the job market and the bill on pension system was in fact a popular no-confidence vote to the government. In the harsh economic circumstances the right-wing opposition took the most adversarial style of behaviour and increased its pressures on the government divided by internal conflicts. Coalition government started to disintegrate – several parties withdrew from the coalitional government in 2011 (DeSUS and the liberal Zares) turning the government into minority government. Prime Minister B. Pahor tried to replace the ministers who stepped out of the government binding his proposal of five new candidates to the vote of confidence. The negative confidence vote on September 20th was a new victory for opposition (36 MPs voted for and 56 against). President of Slovenia D. Turk for the first time in the parliamentary history of Slovenia dismissed the National Assembly and called for the preliminary elections on the 4th of December 2011. Though the new left-wing party Positive Slovenia won greatest share of the votes, the coalition government was finally composed of the right-wing parties and DeSUS under the leadership of J. Janša.

While the proposals of various initiators (individuals, groups of MPs, Trade Unions) for calling referendums augmented again only one referendum on the Law on the Family took place on 25 March 2012. On this referendum with 30.1% turnout a majority of 54.5% voted against the provisions determining equality of the same-sex partners regarding adoption of the children.

### Table 4: Referendums by legislative term and type of opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative term</th>
<th>Referendums on the ...</th>
<th>Type of Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In the Slovene parliamentary system the instruments of direct democracy could not force the opposition and government to compromise but served primarily as a means for deepening the differences and undermining the stability of government. The use of these instruments has not proved to be a democratic device in most cases. By resorting to referendum the adversarial or even hostile right-wing opposition wanted not only to discredit the government but to mobilize its voters in order to block certain reforms. The use of referendums had its price also in the exceptionally high time costs of policy making or implementing structural reforms needed for consolidation of the state finances and countering the economic crisis. At the same time the organized and financially powerful interest groups and different Trade Unions managed to influence the referendum options and timing to their advantage. It was considered by more and more political parties on both sides that the incorporation of the means of direct democracy in the political system of Slovenia meant an over-equipping of the opposition and that its extra-parliamentary veto powers frequently block the urgent reforms.

The only solution in the present situation of economic crisis was limiting the possibilities for misuse of referendums by the changing the Constitution of RS (Articles 90., 97. and 99.). The change, proposed by the left-wing government, adopted on 24 May 2013 without a vote against has abolished the right of the one third of the deputies and of the State Council to demand a referendum (the same right remained only with 40.000 of the voters). It can not be called also on the laws on the taxation, customs, duties and other obligatory charges and on the law adopted for the implementation of the state budget. As well it cannot be called on the laws eliminating the unconstitutionality in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms or any other unconstitutionality. In addition a quorum for the validity of results on referendum has been introduced – the law may be rejected by majority of the voters who have cast valid votes under condition that at least one fifth of all qualified voters have voted against the law. The change of Constitution may be considered as one of the most important examples of non-conflict behaviour and consensual voting in the history of National Assembly.

The new constitutional arrangements on referendum have soon proved to have multiple effects. The first referendum called under new restrictive regulation was proposed by the right-wing opposition demanding to open the files of the secret police gathered in the period before democratization. The referendum-taking place on 8 June 2014 failed (the turnout was 11,68%). Though the question of the access to these files was connected with the dark side of the Slovene history the mobilization potential of the initiators of referendum in the period of harsh economic crisis turned to be weaker than expected. After a new Law on the Family was adopted by coalition majority in the new National Assembly on 3 March, 2015 (with 51 votes for and 28 against) establishing the rights of adoption of children by same sex couples, another initiative for a referendum came from the side of civil activist group 'For the sake of the children'. The group collected the required number of citizens' (40.000) signatures as required by the constitution for a demand for referendum with intention to invalidate changes. Though the coalition majority in the National Assembly again on 25 March, 2015 voted down the demand for the referendum (53 votes for and 21 against) claiming that the new constitutional provisions do not allow referendums on the laws abolishing the unconstitutionality of the matters connected with human rights.
4 Conclusion

In Slovenia the major principles of democratic political and economic transformation have been to a greatest degree accepted and the replacement of one ruling group of parties by an opposition has become a standard of normal everyday political life. Though Slovenia constitutes a good example of extremely competitive and adversarial type of politics where cooperation and consensus among the parliamentary parties has not yet become the normal pattern of political behaviour. In the time when the parliamentary rules have not been successfully interiorized the parties of coalition and opposition entered into fierce disputes (Zajc 2008, 75). Predominant type of the Slovenian parliamentary party behaviour still reflects strong and clear divisions between the government and opposition (Deželan and Sever 2007, 46).

Among the factors, which have influenced the opposition, parties’ behaviour in Slovenia from 1990s on is on the first place the proportional electoral system with low threshold allowing a number of political parties to enter the National Assembly. The electoral rules allowing for a very fragmented party system are not only rendering difficult the building of stable majority coalitions but also affecting the forming of strongly connected and efficient oppositions. The second institutional factor seems to be less relevant since the involvement of opposition in the parliamentary structures and its co-decisional powers have not brought the expected results in the form of more negotiated solutions and consensus voting. The decisive factor is the third - political parties overburdened with ideological issues combined with unresolved dilemmas about Slovenes' history are maintaining strong perceptions of other political groups and parties as bitter adversaries, what may be considered as persistence of some clichés of the former socialist period. This adversarial pattern of behaviour is evident from the data on the cohesion voting in the National Assembly and also from the data on the use of parliamentary means of control over the government - questions and interpellations. One could also see an extremely adversarial behaviour in the introduced constructive no confidence motions and in the voting against confidence motions introduced by Prime Ministers. It is supposed that the constructive no-confidence vote protected also opposition from taking hazardous steps in overturning the governments without being sufficiently organized and prepared to take over government’s responsibilities. While the opposition was successful in both attempts to replace the Prime Minister by own candidate by constructive no-confidence motion, its votes against the introduced confidence motion contributed to the dissolution of coalition government in two of the four cases.

In addition the Slovene parliamentary opposition has been quite frequently resorting to extra-parliamentary means of direct democracy, which were incorporated in the political system of Slovenia. The referendum which turned to be until 2013 one of opposition's most efficient tools intended to delegitimize the coalition governments helped to simplify some political dilemmas but did not contribute to the establishment of the more authoritarian type of democracy. However the relatively free access of to the means of direct democracy in the highly conflictual political context overburdened by the economic crisis has been limited in 2013 by the change of constitution. The opposition has from now on to reconsider its parliamentary strategies and adopt more consensual behaviour, which is more common in parliamentary democracies with longer tradition.
Taking into account these factors, we can see some differences in the behaviour between the right-wing and the left-wing oppositions, the first using the referendum as a populist means to rally supporters, while the left-wing political parties when in opposition showed smaller capacities to mobilize voters. Variations also occurred especially under the influence of foreign factors and pressures to join the EU or to harmonize the legislation with the EU legal order and later because of the impact of the economic crisis (Zajc 2015, 191). At some instances it has been possible to reach agreements between government and opposition on the issues of Slovenia’s position in the EU, foreign policy or terrorism. Those bills which were ideologically free have had more chances to get full consensus than ideologically loaded or contaminated. As in the case of some other countries (Italy, Czech Republic) the dissent is still dominant in the case of the bills dealing with basic rights and liberties, evaluation of the recent history, privatization and the means intended to alleviate poverty of large population strata as a consequence of economic crisis.

The analytical approach used in the analysis of the oppositional behaviour in Slovenian National Assembly is to some extent similar to the approaches used in other parliamentary democracies. Though we could not explain entirely all the factors influencing the behaviour of opposition we can resort to the conclusion that enlarging cooperation with other European countries and engagement in the policy making process on the level of the EU will force the political actors to adopt more consensual patterns of behaviour. Further comparative research is necessary to confirm the validity of this hypothesis.

At the end one should also try to answer the question what is the job of opposition in the present circumstances globalization. Past and present trends of globalization have narrowed the capacities of national states to act autonomously and contributed to some uniformity in policy making. We may unfortunately expect that these trends will also reduce the ability of oppositions to come up with viable alternatives or to express critical stands with regard to the proposed or adopted policies. On the other side the traditional notion of parliamentary opposition seem not to be directly applicable to the EU. Perhaps modern democracies need representation of differences in the sense of innovations but may less need a strong opposition. However, we have remained curious and critical with regard to the EU institutions where the opposition has not yet taken a recognizable shape.

REFERENCES


The “securitization” of the EaP policy in the EU: The external Europeanization in the wider Europe

Attila ÁGH

The European Partnership (EaP) has demonstrated that the EU has deep concern in "Wider Europe" and it has a vital interest in the "wider" Cohesive Europe through an intensive cohesion policy in Eastern Europe. This specific policy needs a new conceptual framework based on the three analytical pillars of the (1) External Europeanization and/or external governance, (2) Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade and (3) the largest possible, complex meaning of security. The Ukrainian crisis has also triggered divergences in the EU foreign policy, but the main tendency of the securitization of the EaP policy and the ensuing rediscovery of the geopolitics has been clear. The EaP is a “nested game” or two-level game reflecting the dynamics of both the domestic and international politics in the countries concerned. The paper outlines the key features of this nested game and provides a “horizon scanning” on the increasing high uncertainty in Wider Europe. The nested game model applies also to the Visegrád Four (V4) states. In the present decade there have been “critical elections” in the V4 states that have caused deep changes in their domestic political systems and, according to the logic of the nested game, they have provoked divergences among these states both in their EU and EaP relationships. At the same time, the last Quarter-Century has produced many common problems and interests in the V4 states in their catching up process and in their global security perceptions. This paper argues that despite their current divergences, the V4 states could and should improve the EU Core-Periphery Divide with the joint interest representation in the EU to avoid the further peripheralization.

1 Attila ÁGH is a Full Professor in the Political Science Department at the Budapest Corvinus University. He was a visiting professor at many universities from Aarhus to Vienna, and from New Delhi to Los Angeles. His major research interest is comparative politics with special regard to the EU developments, focusing the Europeanization and Democratization in the New Member States. In the 2000s and 2010s he has prepared several country reports on Hungary for international comparative democracy projects. He has published altogether more than twenty books and more than hundred papers in several languages, mostly in English.

2 An earlier and shorter version of this paper was written by Attila Agh and Attila Kovács for the Handbook of Cohesion Policy in the EU by Piattoni and Polverari. This enlarged and updated
Key words: external governance; securitization; carrot crisis; integrative balancing.

1 INTRODUCTION: EXTERNAL EUROPEANIZATION THROUGH THE EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP

Eastern Europe (EE) has been a part of “Wider Europe” for the EU, although the institutionalization of the relationships with the EE has taken place relatively late through the stages of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the recent Association Agreements (AA). Actually, the EaP region is the last extension of “Europe”, as the European integration process - the “Europeanization” - has moved eastwards and it has recently reached this easternmost region in its very special forms of “External Europeanization”. This “extension” of the EU, however, has been highly controversial process for both historical and geopolitical reasons. Historically, the contacts between “East” and “West” in the economic, political and cultural dimensions were rather weak, mostly frozen, for a long time that reached its apex in the Cold War period. The East was isolated from the dynamism of the EU due to a lack of intensive cooperation even in the aftermath of Cold War, and this isolation has only slowly diminished. Thus, the “European” perceptions and identities in the EaP states have been multiple and polyvalent. They are not “givens” nowadays either, because they have always been historically determined that has created a mental barrier between East and West with mutual ignorance. The identities of the EaP societies have been rooted in their socio-economic determination of the “longue durée” on one side, but they have lately been influenced by their specific EU context on the other. Simply said, their identity has become “European” to that extent as they could see a “European future” for themselves within the EU or at least with the EU. Although the EU in 2004 in ENP redefined “Europe” with its borders - the EaP with its six states in 2009 was also a practical definition -, the “European perspective” was not given for these countries, and it has not been given nowadays either.3

Geopolitically the EaP region has remained the “in-between” area under the dual influence of the EU and Russia. Russia was not ready to join ENP, therefore the EaP region with its six states has become an area of competition and conflict between the EU and Russia. What is the EaP for the EU, it is the “near abroad” for Russia. Nevertheless, the EaP analysis should not be reduced to the treatment of the EU-Russia relationship, since the EaP countries have their own historical trajectory and socio-political specificity that has to be taken into consideration (Table I), so their geopolitical situation cannot be simplified as the “dependence on Russia”. Whereas in the nineties there was an increasing interest towards the EaP countries in the EU, it has turned to be one of the most

3 The CEPS and EPC have been pioneering in the ENP research and documentation, CEPS with the European Neighbourhood Watch since February 2005 (see recently Blockmans 2015) and EPC with a large horizon analyses (see recently EPC 2015). In the huge literature see also the special issues of Journal of European Public Policy (vol. 16, n.o. 6, 2009), Democratization (vol. 18, n.o. 4, 2011) and International Politics and Society (Balfour and Gromadzki 2011) and Forbrig (2015). The European Integration Index (2015) is a deep and comprehensive overview of the six states with their detailed data in their historical trajectory. This paper relies to a great extent on these sources, but there is no space here to discuss these publications in details.
contested issues in the 2010s due to their domestic crises and recently to the Russian authoritarian revival. In general, in the last decades there has always been some fluidity on both sides, and by now the EaP countries have reached the stage of high uncertainty and unpredictability in the quickly changing global environment. In the present situation not only the small socio-political elites have some kind of “European” identity connected with the EU, but much larger layers of their societies, first of all in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. All in all, it has become clear that the “Easterners” are behaving and thinking “European” to that extent they have been taken seriously by the EU.4

2 COHESION POLICY AS THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF EXTERNAL EUROPEANIZATION

Cohesion policy is the main instrument of the EU for pursuing economic, social and territorial cohesion that has also been developed in the EaP case for providing security in its largest meaning for both sides. The effectiveness of cohesion policy within the EU relies on the institutional and administrative capacity of member states that has recently needed a renewal. This has been accomplished by the Sixth Cohesion Report (EC 2014) based on the principles of the on-going Rule of Law Initiative. The new cohesion policy began in 2014, at the turning point between the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) periods and two main trends can be identified at the EU level. First, given the necessity of building the Energy Union, a big emphasis has also been put in the current MFF on the “connectivity” (infrastructure, transport and energy-transfer) related investments. Second, in the former MFF the gap between the most and least developed NUTS2 regions has increased and the new cohesion policy tries to decrease this gap. Both trends concern very closely the EU cohesion policy in EaP because first, the connectivity has also been a priority in strengthening the relations with this area, and second, the adjacent EU territories on the borders of EaP are among those least developed NUTS2 regions. So there is a positive correlation between the general EU cohesion policy and its particular EaP version in all respects of the economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as in the demand for the institutional capacity building. In EaP there is a strong synergy between the economic and territorial cohesion, and a high spill-over effect works in the policies pursued by the EU, e.g. between the intensive, deep trade and the comprehensive energy security.

With the Eastern enlargement the entire EU cohesion policy has been radically restructured (e.g. Baun and Marek 2008, 295; Dabrowski 2013) to perform its integrative balancing role in the EU28. The low absorption capacity and the poor effectiveness of cohesion policy in NMS has been a constant topic from the very beginning of Eastern enlargement (Bachtler et al. 2014; Freise and Garbert 2013). This debate has influenced the extension of cohesion policy to the EaP region and the approach to Cohesive Europe beyond the EU. In general, in the present period (2014–2020) of the Multiannual Financial Perspective (MFF) serious changes have taken place in the EU cohesion policy and in the philosophy of differentiated integration (Ágh 2015b). Thus, the recent emphasis on connectivity and administrative capacity as well as on the divergence of the

4 Russia has also been a main player in the ENP game, but there is no space here to deal with its role at length. In the Introduction of the Special Issue on Russian foreign policy the editors conclude that “The crisis in Ukraine exploded the status conflict between Russia and the West (...) the West is willing to recognize Russia’s status as a great power in terms of existing normative order. It seems that this does not satisfy Russia.” (Forsberg et al. 2014, 267).
NUTS2 regions has a direct impact not only for on Energy Union and NMS, but also on the EaP cohesion policy.

In developing a conceptual framework for the cohesion policy in the EaP region it is important to note first that the EU with its rules and values has acted as a "normative power" and "a centre of gravity". In general, it has played a role of a global actor as the "civilian superpower" (Piattoni 2010, 301; Larsen 2014) that gives the substance of the "Europeization" process. These terms have turned more and more from virtual to actual during the series of enlargements, and finally, the Eastern enlargement has opened up the way for the External Europeanization of the new EU neighbours in Wider Europe. The accelerated, "running" globalization has necessitated the process of "globalization cum regionalization" through the worldwide process of the External Europeanization. The issue how to "govern" the third countries beyond the EU based on the rules of the European Governance has also wider implications because the particular relations of the EU with the regions concerned has to be taken into account. Namely, the issue of European External Governance (EEG) has emerged (1) in the world in general as global governance by the civil superpower, (2) in the EU development policy in African, Caribbean and Pacific region, (3) in the Southern part of ENP, especially concerning the "traditional" associated members (e.g. Morocco), (4) in the Wider Europe with the six EaP "partner states" and (5) in the "pre-accession" region of West Balkans.

The issue how to "govern" the third countries beyond the EU based on the rules of the EEG has also wider implications because the particular relations of the EU with the regions concerned has to be taken into account. Namely, the issue of External Governance has emerged concerning (1) the world in general as global governance by the civil superpower, (2) the EU development policy in African, Caribbean and Pacific region, (3) the case of the Southern part of ENP, especially concerning the "traditional" associated members (e.g. Morocco), (4) in the Wider Europe with the six EaP "partner states" and (5) the "pre-accession" region of West Balkans. The EEG has become quite relevant in the specific case of EaP states after the Eastern Enlargement as the issue of Cohesive Europe in Wider Europe, but unlike in the West Balkans, this comprehensive cohesion policy is just a substitute for enlargement, therefore the terms of "Enlargement-lite" and/or "Europeization-lite" has been commonly used for EaP. External Europeanization in EaP is the goal, and the EU cohesion policy through EEG is the main instrument of the Eastern policy. The external governance is very specific in EaP, since in this region the external periphery (EaP) and internal periphery (NMS) of the EU meet that creates a special mix for EEG.

The conceptual framework of EEG has been well elaborated, although it still needs a further elaboration in the present situation of the deepening crisis. No surprise that the issue of external governance was an eminent topic in the European Studies in the second half of 2000s and it has turned to be a vital issue for in the mid-2010s due to the Ukrainian crisis with its new, complex meaning of security. Basically, External Europeanization means according to Schimmelfennig (2012, 657–659) that "the EU projects its own regulatory model(s), institutions and rules of governance beyond the borders of formal membership and does so in institutional forms of coordinated action that aim at the production of collectively binding agreements", in such a way "external governance results in Europeization." The EEG has general principles coming from the EU norms and rules of the European Governance, at the same time it has been arguably even more shaped by "the issue specific regimes of the EU in a broad variety of areas of public policy", therefore the Europeanization effects
are “patchy”. Externalization is an indirect mechanism of Europeanization is based both on the EU proactive actions to promote its values and on the socialization process of the participants from the EaP side.\(^5\)

Altogether, the EaP megaproject can be outlined as follows:

1. The EU can only be competitive globally if it develops a proper regionalization in its neighbourhood by the External Europeanization.
2. The specific way of the EU "extension" in integrating further countries into the Wider Europe is providing means for the "integrative balancing", i.e. decreasing the economic, political and social gap between the EU and its (Eastern) Neighbourhood and extending the European Governance to the European External Governance (EEG).
3. After the Eastern enlargement the EU has exhausted its enlargement capacity and there has been a "carrot crisis" in the ENP countries concerned due to the lack of offering something meaningful for the deep structural reforms through the EEG.
4. The EaP can be considered as the first step by building partnership structures in cohesion policy and the Vilnius Declaration by introducing the Deep and Comprehensive Trade Area (DCTA) project as the second step to solve the carrot crisis.
5. Nowadays obviously some further steps should be taken to manage the increasing Ukrainian crisis, or the much wider crisis in the EaP region, that concerns not only the EU-Russia tension, since it has developed a global dimension with the US involvement in geopolitical considerations and in the complex energy security issues.\(^6\)

This process has been deeply analysed in all dimensions in the European Studies, but this paper can deal only with the securitization in the Eastern relationships of the EU through the lens of the external governance in its present conflict. The Eastern member states and the EaP states as neighbours have intensive contacts of necessity, due to the common history with similar problems and striking differences, as to the convergence in the general development efforts on one side and divergence in the specific Europeanization strategies on the other. Namely, when Cohesive Europe has been extended to the "East" through the EEG, the cohesion policy, as the blood circulation within the EU, has also gained an extended meaning through the financial transfers by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in the former MFF, and by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in the on-going MFF (Table II). These financial constructions have been the special EU transfers in EaP as direct efforts for integrative balancing, but the EU cohesion policy in EaP has been much larger and complex process. It has mainly worked through the intensive economic contacts that have been innovative in many ways, since a "comprehensive institution building program" has also been attached to it.

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\(^5\) On the EEG see Lavanex and Schimmelfennig (2009); on its application to Moldova and Ukraine see Baltag and Romanyshyn (2011); and on the dependence on Russia as a "constraining" factor of EaP see Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009).

\(^6\) This short overview relies on my former papers on the ENP, in which I have discussed the idea of "globalization cum regionalization", "integrative balancing" and "carrot crisis" (Ágh 2010 and 2012). On the recent situation in NMS see Ágh (2014 and 2015a). In this paper I deal only with the Eastern dimension of ENP and I concentrate on the V4 states. It can be also considered as a particular case of differentiated integration (see Ágh 2015b; Leruth and Lord 2015).
3 FROM ENP TO EAP: FROM “PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY” TO “DEEP TRADE” PRAGMATISM

External Europeanization has evolved in a historical process in several stages of subsequent agreements (Table III). The original aim of the ENP in 2004 was the creation of “ring of friends” and to encircle itself with “well-governed countries”. In the optimistic spirit of the “coloured revolutions” in EE, in the first stage of the Eastern cohesion policy the EU envisioned not only increasing the economic contacts with the Eastern countries, but first of all a general democratization through external governance (Buscaneanu 2015; Cheneval et al. 2015; Freyburg et al. 2011; Lavanex and Schimmelfennig 2011). Europeanization meant institution building at both the state and civil society levels in the spirit of the EU’s role as the “centre of gravity”. The EU expected a relatively quick adjustment of the EE countries to the EU due to its “normative challenge”. Even the intensive economic contacts acted supposedly as promoting welfare and prosperity, and - through many spill-over effects - it also “fostered” the democratic order as an easy dream on democracy promotion.7

In the efforts to create a Cohesive Europe the idea of an institution transfer in Wider Europe dominated in EEG, without raising the issue whether the new institutions remained on surface as a mere formal-legal façade or could become an organic part of society. The EU in its relations with outsiders seemed to favour top-down governance approach based on rule transfer and conditionality. However, the original ENP was too general, not specific and differentiated enough, neither between the East and South, nor within the East. Hence, the institutional reforms remained shallow and ineffective, since the big formal institutions would have necessitated structural reforms. They would have to be based on many smaller informal institutions and the civic patterns of behaviour that were missing in the EE region. Furthermore, their emergence would have needed much longer time and much more favourable international environment. Although the EaP was a big step forward compared to the original ENP in specifying the relationships and also in their financing instruments, nonetheless the content of the partnership structure remained vague and the dual – multilateral and bilateral - track approach proved to be controversial. The added value of the initiative, strategic partnership was still not defined properly: “In summary, as the research indicates, EU ‘politics of inclusion’ remain patchy and inconsistent, making it difficult for the neighbours to commit themselves to the European course of reform. (…) All neighbours felt that they were ‘caught’ between the EU and Russia” (Korosteleva 2011, 14–15).8

All in all, this new EaP megaproject, that was elaborated at the Prague Summit (2009) and further developed at the Warsaw Summit (2011), was based on the renewed dual track approach through deepening both bilateral relations and multilateral dimensions. This program presupposed that the multilateral and bilateral approaches can be harmonized, even if the big diversity of bilateral approaches would be kept, but it also overvalued the regional approach and

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7 EaP has also established some institutions that have been helpful both in the EU-EaP and regional cooperation. Euronest Parliamentary Assembly (3 May 2011 in Brussels) is a parliamentary forum to promote political association and economic integration, composed of the EP delegation (60 MEPs) and 50 EaP delegates (5x10, none from Belarus). The EaP Civil Society Forum (CFS) is part of the program to facilitate and monitor the democratic transition, its Steering Committee meets annually.

8 On the conceptual and practical limitations of EaP as a continuing “carrot crisis”, see also Korosteleva et al. (2013 and 2014).
suggested mostly common solutions for the EaP region as a whole. The Multilevel Governance (MLG) and the Multidimensional Governance (MDG) principles appeared also in the EEG, above all the MLG as emphasising the decentralization in the civil society for democracy promotion. The MDG principle was less promoted, although the high complexity of policies would have needed this approach very much. The prevalence of the EU interest in fostering the trade relations pushed aside the complexity of policies and this neglected approach came back later in securitization with vengeance. Thus, ENP, and later EaP, had a “patchwork character”, i.e. its “sectoral policies” were not really coordinated. At the same time the “sectoral” efforts were important to go ahead in some fields anyway, without being disturbed by other policy fields that might involve more conflicts.9

This normative approach of “democracy promotion” produced an obvious “carrot crisis” because the EU had nothing relevant to offer for the EE states instead of the European perspective to make structural reforms. This led to the Polish-Swedish proposal of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) introduced by the EU with its basic document, the European Council Declaration of May 2009. To revitalize this aim of Cohesive Europe in Wider Europe first a joint declaration was signed in Prague in 2009 with the six Eastern partners – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – about the EaP to facilitate closer cooperation in “political association” and “economic integration”. EaP meant a turning point in the Cohesive Europe with its more realistic spirit, since it wanted to remedy the weaknesses of the original ENP scheme. The promotion of democracy has not been given up, and the respect for common values of the “deep and sustainable democracy” has come back in all EaP documents, but has become more specific and sophisticated, and the “deep trade” has been more and more emphasized instead.10

The EaP introduced the partnership structures with much more sensitivity for the individual states concerned in the relationship of multilateral and bilateral approaches, since the six states diverged a lot in their socio-economic situation (Table IV), and consequently, in their participation in, and contribution to, EaP (Table V). In general, the case of differentiated integration/membership has appeared from new angle of flexible external governance from the rapid conflict management in Ukraine and Moldova (see e.g. Baltag and Romanyshyn 2011) through the sleeping conflict in Georgia to the “benign neglect” in Belarus, partly in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the differentiated integration appeared in the “more for more” principle. It meant that the more a country progresses in democratic reforms and institution building, the more additional support it can expect. Thus, keeping the emphasis on shared values and joint ownership, this pragmatic turn abandoned the naïve ideas of rapid democratization through the massive institution transfer and the easy harmonization of the multilateral and bilateral approaches. It focused on the extension of the “deep” economic and/or trade relationships by elaborating the magic term of “deep trade”, meaning comprehensive economic and social transformations as the effect of intensive trade relations (Table VI).

9 The EEG has also meant an extension of the MLG literature to EE, see Faludi (2012). Simona Piattoni has pointed out (2010, 177–191) that the MLG principle has only not involved an empirical challenge in the EU, but also a normative challenge in democratization as decentralization, accountability and transparency.

10 In this spirit, the establishment of European Endowment for Democracy (EED) in 2011 was to encourage “deep and sustainable democracy” by “Fostering – not exporting – democracy and freedom” (EED 2015). I do not engage here in the discussion of the naïve expectation of democratization in EE by the EaP projects that have been in a strong continuity with the Western fallacy in the democratization in NMS (Ágh 2015a).
In the EaP megaproject launched by the Prague and Warsaw Summits with its spill-over effects worked to some extent, indeed, although they were not as "deep" as expected by the EU. In addition, the energy policy or energy security became more and more the priority in both the EU and EaP policies. With this energy pressure the securitization process began. However, the external governance in energy matters is especially difficult, and it hampers the spill-over effects in other policy fields. The EaP introduced a complex set of specific rules, well beyond the general democratization and this system raised the issue of compliance with the new rules. The effective compliance means an adherence to the provisions of the accord and to the implementing measures not only in the formal-legal transposition, but also in its real enforcement and proper application. Several factors go against the full implementation as the weak administrative capacity and high domestic adoption costs, namely misfit with national rules, and/or general domestic preferences, and the party-political interests. This situation leads to actual non-compliance with increasing reform-fatigue and placebo reforms. Therefore, the EU has introduced a large set of indicators as the EaP Index (Table V) for the assessment of the effective compliance in order to evaluate its country-specific partnership system. This EaP Index charts the progress made by the six countries in EU integration by the indicators on (1) the linkage as the depth and intensity of the contacts with the EU, (2) the approximation as the convergence with the EU rules and values and (3) the management as the performance of institutional structures, hence it provides a cross-country and cross-sector picture in a historical trajectory between 2011 and 2014.

4 FROM WARSAW TO VILNIUS: THE ELABORATION OF ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS

At the Vilnius Summit in 2013 there were negotiations on Association Agreements (AA) – based on the DCFTA – to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). Finally the AAs with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were signed in Brussels on 27 June 2014. An ambitious agenda was also agreed upon in Vilnius with the commitments of political, economic and social reforms, since "DCFTA goes beyond a classical free trade agreement. It concerns not only the liberalisation of trade in goods (...) and services, but broad provisions on establishment of companies and on the harmonisation of the partner countries' trade-related legislation with the EU acquis communautaire (the body of EU laws and regulations)." In general, "The EU shared its cohesion and regional development experience with partner countries to help them address internal regional socio-economic disparities." (EaP 2013, 5, 13), and this statement can be the motto of the EaP (see EaP 2015a).11

The Association Agreements with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) replaced the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements concluded with the partner countries in the late 1990s (with the exception of Belarus). DCFTA is part of an Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and any country of the ENPI-ENI. It is one of EU’s the most ambitious bilateral agreements yet. The DCFTA offers partner countries a framework for modernising its trade relations and for economic development. This takes place by the opening of markets via

11 "The Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) programme was set up in 2012 to provide initiatives – in the form of increased financial assistance – for continued efforts in democratic transformation (...) Since its launch in 2012, the EaPIC program has mobilised EUR 152 million of additional funding." (EaP 2013, 9).
the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas, and by an extensive harmonisation of laws, norms and regulations in various trade-related sectors, creating the conditions for aligning key sectors of their economies to EU standards to facilitate FDI (Table VII). DCFTA goes beyond a classical free trade agreement, indeed. It concerns not only the liberalisation of trade in goods (by lifting customs duties and abolishing trade quotas) and services, but broad provisions on establishment of companies and on the harmonisation of the partner countries’ trade-related legislation with the EU *acquis communautaire*.

Membership of the WTO is a precondition for entering negotiations on the DCFTA. It aims to remove customs duties on imports and exports. Traditional trade defence instruments (anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and global safeguard) as well as technical barriers to trade shall also comply with WTO rules. DCFTA agreements contain also provisions for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. DCFTA also include provisions on movement of capital, public procurement issues and trade in services, including electronic commerce (Table VIII). Provisions also cover intellectual property issues and competition rules as well as the provision of transparency in administrative matters. The Association Agreements, including DCFTAs, are designed to support far reaching political and socio-economic reforms and facilitate comprehensive approximation towards the EU, its rules and standards. The effective future implementation of Association Agreements and, where relevant, DCFTAs, accompanied by reforms could bring about the comprehensive approximation with EU legislation and standards leading to the gradual economic integration of partners in the EU internal market and therefore to the creation of an economic area. They undertake to review DCFTAs at the EaP Summits, the possible further steps that could be taken to advance economic integration with a view to creating an economic area in light of implementation of the Association Agreements.

Real progress on DCFTAs can only be achieved with economies that welcome competition, have well-functioning institutions and a legal framework that guarantees a safe business-and investment climate. Supposedly, DCFTA would have strong spill-over effects pushing towards the mutual harmonization among the various policy fields and also among the countries concerned. The intensive and increasing trade relations would generate structural changes also in some other policy fields, as deepening External Europeanization, first of all through the improvement of social environment for the business/trade/investment sectors. The DCFTA based EaP project was indeed more pragmatic and more successful, however - although to a lesser extent - it reproduced the former Western fallacy on the relatively easy institution transfer and very rapid spill-over effect from the “deep trade” to the other social sectors.

The EaP multilateral dimension in the Vilnius Declaration provides a new forum between 2014 and 2017 for strengthening multilateral cooperation through four thematic platforms: (1) democracy and good governance, (2) economic integration and convergence with the EU sector policies, (3) energy security and (4) contact between people. It indicates the outlines of further activity and main directions of the EU cohesion policy: “The participants of the Vilnius Summit acknowledge the significance of multilateral cooperation in support of deeper bilateral relations. (...) the fora of multilateral dimension are the place where exchanges between the EU and all six partners can be held” (EaP 2013, 11). Accordingly, in the financial support of ENI, “Assistance will be focused on a few sectors of concentration, with the aim of increasing ownership, quality as results as a means to contribute towards the modernisation and social cohesion of societies.” At the same time, the participants emphasized also the importance
of regional cooperation and encouraged "the development of efficient inter-regional and cross-border cooperation dialogue, including ECTC (European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation), to facilitate partners' social and economic development." (EaP 2013, 12).

Paradoxically, the Vilnius declaration was the big event of the pragmatic stage, at the same time it turned out to be the start of the new stage of crisis management due to the deepening Ukrainian crisis. In Vilnius the Ukrainian President Yanukovych refused to sing the AA for Ukraine that provoked the pro-EU mass protest movement, which deprived him of power. With the Ukrainian crisis from the late 2013 the traditional military security dimension has come back with a vengeance as the quickly widening securitization process. Since then the EaP megaproject has been overburdened with the crisis management of the increasing conflict between the EU and Russia. The MDG principle of policy coordination has appeared in the complexity of security coordination, beyond the military dimension also in economy, energy and politics and it has become the new pragmatic priority. Although the energy policy looked like the unifying factor in the security challenge as "the external dimension of regulatory state" (Goldthau and Sitter 2014), but when the non-conventional, "hybrid" war broke out, the traditional-military security issues in fact became the real common denominator in a new, non-traditional form.

Altogether, the hard and soft dimensions of security effects have influenced the EU Eastern policies more and more directly with the frozen conflicts and mass migrations on one side and with the violations of human rights, persecutions of civil organizations and abusive minority policies in the EaP states on the other. The EaP regional integration as the multilateral European External Governance has become a dream or reduced to diplomatic nicety. At the same time, there has been a shift in security policy from the traditional to the complex meaning, embracing financial, economic, energy-related security in its political-global dimensions. This shift can easily be described in the present Ukrainian crisis. In this respect the EaP countries need also the regional "security integration" with the EU through the EaP, since all countries under scrutiny are "contested states" to a great extent.12

5 FROM VILNIUS TO RIGA: FROM TRADE PRAGMATISM TO THE CRISIS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The conflict with Russia in the EaP region has also generated an internal conflict within the EU and deepened the Core-Periphery Divide that has been replicated in NMS, first of all in the V4 states, as the Semi-Periphery Divide. In fact, the Eastern policy of the EU has divided the EU from the very beginning, given that the Southern member states opposed to the newly emerged megaproject for Wider Europe. The Ukrainian crisis and the sanctions against Russia have divided the EU even more because some member states have preferred more confrontation, and some others less confrontation with Russia. The increasing security challenge has produced the crisis of crisis management in the EU's effort for Cohesive Europe in Wider Europe. This big Eastern crisis with the expansionist Russia and declining EaP region has come as a surprise to the EU,

12 The conceptual shift in security policy from the narrow, traditional meaning to the largest complex meaning has been described in my recent chapter on the EU foreign policy (Ágh, 2014: 116–117). According to Barry Buzan (2015), the English School has elaborated the “societal approach” to security that provides a “normative framing” for securitization in its largest meaning.
since Europeans must have lost the habit and the expertise to analyse the world in geopolitical terms in the relatively relaxed period of the multipolar era (Biscop 2015, 2). In this respect the "rethinking of the EU's development paradigm" in EaP may be relevant as well (EPC 2015).

In 2015 and afterwards more uncertainty can be expected than ever before, since "The revised ENP Strategy will be characterized by the abandonment of 'more for more, less for less' conditionality and the further differentiation of relations with each of neighbouring countries, taking their own and their neighbours' interest more into account. As such, the ENP will be detached from the EU’s enlargement philosophy and thus come to resemble a more classic foreign policy." (Blockmans 2015, 2). Indeed, the European External Action Service has increasingly become involved the Eastern policy (EEAS 2015) as the regional security has come to the fore. The “more for more” principle can hardly be kept in 2015, since the manoeuvring room for the EaP states has drastically shrunked, and the commitment to democracy has decided the choice of the EaP states between the EU and the autocratic Russia (Buscaneanu 2015). The Riga Summit has focused on the Ukrainian crisis and it has only taken small steps elsewhere, e.g. in the visa liberalization process (Kaca 2015). The Riga Declaration has called for the "multilateral and bilateral security dialogue" in EaP, and it has made references to energy security (EaP 2015b, 8, 12), but otherwise has not dealt seriously with the securitization of the EaP region in its complexity. Riga Summit has been described as non-event and/or survival summit with ongoing stagnation in EaP, due to the “growing instability in the EU's neighbourhoods”, since they are “exposed to ever changing developments and are slipping from crisis to crisis” (Egmont 2015, 2–5).

However, most analysts have not distinguished between two issues: (1) the former, pre-crisis approach of the EU in EaP was already inadequate in many ways, and (2) the new, post-crisis approach needs even more new policies that have not yet been elaborated. The same problem appears in the four scenarios (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2014) written by the joint group of the EU-EaP experts in the late 2014, in which the Scenario I (Shared Home) and Scenario II (Common Home) at that time already lost their relevance. Namely the Shared Home scenario presupposes that the EU and Russia after this lost decade of political crises and economic stagnation would focus on the shared interest, so the EaP countries could be developed through the deep trade and were not forced to decide between them. The Common Home scenario puts even more emphasis on the democratization of Russia and on its common interests with the EU in the global competition to resolve the European conflicts in order to counter the common threats. Whereas the Scenario III (Broken Home) takes the authoritarian modernization of Russia into account and predicts continuing confrontation with it, turning the EaP region into a zone of permanent instability. Finally, Scenario IV (Divided Home) forecasts even the further deterioration of the EU-Russia relations due to the Russian efforts to carve out a sphere of influence, therefore no political and economic transformation takes place, and the EaP region would be locked in a stalemate. Here we are.

6 THE DEEPENING V4 DIVIDE AND THE CONTRAST OF EXTERNAL AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Beyond the general interest and/or disinterest of the EU in the East, there has been a special interest of NMS in the partnership with their close neighbourhood. The EaP was a Polish-Swedish initiative, and so far all biannual
EaP Summits have taken place in NMS. Nonetheless, this new “horizontal” divide between the tough and soft attitudes towards Russia has also appeared in NMS that has also created a “vertical” divide as a contrast between their external governance and their special security governance in the EaP case. First, there has been a split between its Northern and Southern parts, since the former have had more concern in EaP and the latter in the Balkan and Black Sea region. Second, even more so, the V4 states have diverged in their relationships to Russia that has deepened the divide between Poland and Hungary, and to a lesser extent, between Poland and the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well. As to the vertical divide, it has been the strongest in the Polish case – similarly also in the Baltic states and Romania –, where the security governance has dominated, and the weakest in the Hungarian case – similarly also in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria –, where the structure of the external governance has been more or less kept with the dominance of foreign trade relations, but at the same time they have abided the NATO security arrangements in the region.

The V4 cooperation has been elaborated in a rich body of literature, its overview has been given in the recent paper of Törő et al. (2014) that has also discussed the activities of the V4 states in the EaP matters. The particular merit of this paper is that it has also described the “V4+” formations, first of all that of “V4+B3” formation with the three Baltic states (2014, 367, 376, etc.), which has been especially important in the case of the EaP Summits. But the analysis of this paper has not been extended beyond the positive side of cooperation to the negative experiences. It has dealt mostly with the V4 as the “coordinating bridge” (2014, 377), and not so much with the detailed analysis of the conflicts within the V4. The paper has only mentioned “controversies” in general terms (2014, 390), first of all concerning the Ukrainian crisis and their relationships towards Russia.13

No doubt, however, that the expansionism of Russia and the authoritarian rule of Putin after 2011 have created a deep split in V4. Poland has strongly opposed this new Russian politics, while the other V4 states have developed much more reconciliatory behaviour, the Czech Republic and Slovakia mostly for economic reasons, Hungary due to the special ties of the Orbán government with the Putin’s Russia. But the close contacts and the suspicious contracts between the Hungarian government and the Putin leadership have raised concern in the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well. Thus, the Austrian challenge to V4 proved to be attractive and it led to a new formation in the Slavkov meeting and agreement on 29 January 2015, leaving aside both Poland and Hungary. Actually, the first humiliation of the Hungarian government was its exclusion from the Slavkov meeting of Austria, Czech Republic and Slovakia. It demonstrated already the increasing isolation of the Hungarian government due to its pro-Russian course and praising the “success” of the Putin’s Russia in the Orbán’s speeches.

The traditionally good relationships between Poland and Hungary – mentioned usually as the “two brothers” in everyday parlance – have been drastically deteriorated by the pro-Russian political and economic turn of the Orbán government. The main deal for the Orbán government is the Paks-II nuclear

13 Christian Schweiger (2013) describes the V4 relationships in a more differentiated approach as the “multiple cores” in the EU. The relationships of the Baltic states to the Ukrainian conflict would deserve a special analysis, also with regards to the V4+B3 cooperation. Moreover, the specific interests of NMS in the Eastern cohesion policy have also come up in the sub-national regional cooperation in the border regions, since the territorial interest representation is also part of external governance (see Dabrowski 2013).
reactor, contracted with Rosatom firm. This contract is very bad deal for Hungary and very good deal for Russia, but it gives a manoeuvring room of euro millions for the Orbán government and its oligarchic clientele. The symbolical visit of Putin in Hungary on 16 February 2015 and his common, friendly press conference with Viktor Orbán caused a big international uproar, especially in Poland, where PiS, the traditional ally of Orbán condemned this event with strong words. Afterwards, Orbán’s visit to Warsaw was again a failure and second humiliation. This visit was called by the Polish PM Ewa Kopacz “frank and difficult”, and the PiS leaders were not ready to meet him. By the summer 2015 Orbán perceived the disadvantages of his isolation not only in the EU28 but also in the V4. Orbán in his Tusványos speech in July 2015 made big gestures to Poland, inviting Poland to lead the V4 cooperation, but it remained without a positive response, with justification. This divide between Poland and Hungary – reinforced by the “third way” of the Czech Republic and Slovakia - prevents to a great extent the common interest representation of V4 as a regional organization.  

As to the vertical divide in policy governance, the Polish concern has been the highest in the EU and their approach has usually been the most critical about the current developments. A Polish EaP report in early 2015 actually described this crisis of crisis management and it questioned the EU’s “experimentalist governance” in the analysis of the security, energy and migration governance. The Report criticized first of all the EU security policy as regards the “soft line” towards Russia in the new Cold War: “The EU’s neighbourhood policy has been driven by a strong liberal assumption that the best way to secure stability is to improve governance, and to strengthen economic cooperation. (...) the EU conducted its security policy with economic means accompanied by political dialogue” (Godzimirski et al. 2015, 7–8). The Report also noted that the EU was not ready and able to meet the mass migration challenges from the EaP region, and it was even more critical about its energy policy: “The external dimension of the EU energy policy, as an extension of internal EU regulations, is prone the same weaknesses.” (ibid., 14). All in all, “In the wider realm of security, some alterations in the EU’s neighbourhood policies are clearly needed. Although there are some confirmations of the role of the EU’s economic clout and security instruments, and of the continuing attractiveness of its governance model, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has revealed that the previous framework was insufficient.” (ibid., 14 and 25).

Given the fact that the Ukrainian crisis is deepening, the perspectives of the V4 cooperation are too bad, as the Polish observers noted in a second Report in the mid-2015: “even the future of the V4 is now questioned because of the deep differences among its members’ perceptions of Russia” (Rieker and Terlikowski 2015, 1). In their view, the V4 states after joining NATO, had the same security perception and were “able to speak with one voice on crucial issues debated in

the Alliance” that was disturbed by “their divergent threat perceptions” of “the Russian-driven hybrid war”. This Report concentrated on the V4 military cooperation and it had only a modest view on the other dimensions of the V4 cooperation: “The pragmatic character of this cooperation (...) excluded regional integration projects in any dimension, much less defence.” Altogether, within the NATO framework the special security governance earlier worked well in the V4, and although the authors were unsatisfied with it in the deepening security crisis, they still stated that “despite the differences regarding Russia on the high political level, the V4 countries seem to display increasing willingness to tighten cooperation in the military domain (...) despite the diverging assessments on the place and role of Russia in European security policy.” (ibid., 3 and 8–9). It means that between the external governance in general and the security governance in particular the contrast has recently increased that has to be the main reason for the crisis of crisis management. In fact, in my view, this contrast has originated from the “patchy” character of the EaP, i.e. from the missing coordination and synchronization of the various policies in the European External Governance hurting the MDG principle.

7 CONCLUSIONS: THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGE AND THE EU TRANSFORMATION CRISIS

The EU special interest in the EE has been moving in cycles, since right after the end of the Cold War it diminished, but the Eastern Enlargement has increased the interest in the new neighbours, and it has become quite intensive in the period of the new “Cold War” at the crossroads of energy and traditional security. Although some Eastern EU members - first of all Poland - have tried to keep EaP high on the EU agenda, the EU’s Eastern policy has still been influenced to a great extent by the fact that the limits of the EU’s integration capacity have been shown in NMS because in the first decade of membership they have failed “transcending the East-West divide” (see Epstein and Jacoby 2014). This failure has also indicated the weaknesses of the EU’s cohesion policy as the limit of its “transformative power”. The weak absorption capacity of the NMS in cohesion policy has been investigated by both the EU and by the analysts (Bachtler et. al. 2014), therefore, the EEG has also focused more and more on the strengthening the administrative capacity of the EaP states.

The current EU “transformation crisis” is a multilevel game for the EU with its increasing internal tension in overcoming the global crisis at both the EU and the member states levels, overburdened by the new security challenge in the East. Nowadays the biggest problem for the EU is how to restart economic growth, first of all in the Southern periphery due to the increasing Core-Periphery Divide, when facing a tough global competition (Schweiger 2014). Moreover, the EU democracy depends not only on the newly developed internal forms and contents, but also more and more on the international challenges, including the level and forms of democracy in its neighbourhood (Cheneval et al. 2015). Thus, the security challenge in the East, in its largest meaning as the military, political and energy security issue, has disturbed the EU and it has led to the freezing of the External Europeanization due to the increasing internal instability of the EaP states that has caused instability in the EU in a vicious circle.

This situation of high complexity needs a complexity management based on the strong coordination of the EU policies in EaP that could be elaborated by the EU step by step going beyond the Minsk type of troubleshooting in order to coping
with the contrast between the external governance and security policy. The rethinking of the current crisis management has to produce a new Eastern policy, since Cohesive Europe in Wilder Europe is still an important part of the Future Europe. The "top challenge for 2015" for the EU is, indeed, that “The EU should carefully differentiate between the six Eastern partner countries, and provide intense support to Ukraine to help it overhaul its system of governance against the backdrop of the war in Eastern Ukraine.” (EaP Index 2015, 7). Accordingly, the top challenge for the V4 states is to overcome their internal debates deepened by the Ukrainian crisis. Otherwise, without a common representation of their interests in the EU, they will be marginalized within the EU as its stagnating Semi-Periphery in the period of the running globalization and sharpening global competitiveness.

REFERENCES


EU Neighbourhood Info Centre. 2015. Available at http://www.enpi-info.eu/.


Appendix

### Table I: General Features of the EAP Countries

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**TABLE II** - Europe Neighbourhood Instrument

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**TABLE III** - EAP Agreements (Short)

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Note: EIP = European Instrument for Partnership and Peace; EAP = European Assistance Program; EUR = European Union Revenue; UAH = Ukrainian Hryvnia.
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Source: European External Action Service.
### TABLE IV – BASIC ECONOMIC DATA OF THE EAP COUNTRIES

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### TABLE V – EASTERN PARTNERSHIP INDEX

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Source: www.eap-index.eu
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Note: FDI flows are measured in millions of US dollars.
TOWARDS AN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY CLASS? A PROPOSAL FOR A TYPOLOGY OF THE MEPS

Eugenio SALVATI 1

The article tries to analyse the structure of the European parliamentary class and to understand if there is the enforcement of a core group of European politicians within the European Parliament. Starting from a brief review of the literature, the paper enlightens the relevance of the studies on the parliamentary class to gain also useful information on political institutions. After this, an attempt of typology for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) has been introduced and, in conclusion, the paper presents the empirical data based on this typology with reference to the 2009-2014 European Parliament. This typology could be useful to evaluate the strengthening of a European parliamentary class, which represents a good indicator about the enforcement of the EP’s institutionalization process. The gathered data highlights some important distinctions between the various member states but confirms the trend towards the empowerment of a core group of European politicians.

**Key words:** European parliament; political elite; representation; institutionalization; European Union.

1 INTRODUCTION

In all the political systems of western democracies there is a group of politicians that can be labelled as professional and, using Max Weber’s famous statement, don’t live only “for politics” but also “off politics” (Weber 1958). One of the most important things concerning the professionalization of politics is the opportunity to find a vast amount of different career patterns connected with several political systems. For example in many European countries – differently from the U.S. experience - the career within the party is an important prerequisite for a future position in the party lists and for a governmental...

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1 Eugenio SALVATI, University of Pavia, Department of Political and Social Sciences. Eugenio Salvati holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Pavia, where he is a teaching and research assistant. His research interests focus on political institutions, comparative politics, political elite, parliamentary institutions and the process of European integration, in particular the development of supranational institutions. He has recently published articles in Quaderni di Scienza Politica, the International Spectator and Modern Italy (forthcoming).
appointment. But what can we say about the political careers at the European level? Have they similar features as the ones at the national level or are they characterized by proper features? The aim of this paper is to propose a valuable typology of the political careers in the EP based on the past experience of the elected at the EP, in order to analyse the issue concerning the strengthening of a new group of representatives in the EU, which have the opportunity to bring representation to the supranational level. The study of political careers represents a useful tool also to know the institutional environment in which these patterns take place; it allows us to understand institutional stability and dynamism (Cotta 1979; Ilonszki 2012). The first part of the paper is committed to the theoretical framework and to the literature devoted to this topic; in this part I'll introduce some important elements to study this new political class. The second part is focused on the presentation of the classification in order to sketch some possible profiles of the MEPs. In the last part I'll present the empirical data based on the analysis of the MEPs of the seventh European parliament.

2 THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CLASS

The literature devoted to the analysis of the European parties and the MEPs has focused its attention mainly on two aspects: the first is to evaluate the socialization power of the EP (Katz 1997; Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Scully and Farrell 2003; Scully 2005) and the second is mainly committed to understand who the "principal" of the MEPs is; the national parties or the European parliamentary groups (Hix 2002; Kreppel 2002; Faas 2003; Hix, Kreppel and Noury 2003; Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). For what concerns the socializing value of the EP (Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Scully 2005), the focus has been on the study of the socializing power in the European institutions, an element that can be able to promote more pro-European feelings in the members of these institutions.

The studies concerning the socialization within the EP highlights that there is not a "going native process" (Scully 2005) that takes place in the EP and this is confirmed by some empirical evidences like the fact, for example, that MEPs haven't a different vision of the European integration process compared to the MNPs.

For the second steam of research – the MEPs' loyalty – Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) used the expression of "agents with two principals" to define who "controls" the MEPs, referring to the national parties and to the European groups. According to the authors the main principal of the MEPs is the national party, which controls the selection and re-election mechanism, and in case of conflict between the national party and the European party group, the MEPs prefer to accord their loyalty to the home party rather than to the party group. This confirms that MEPs who desire a long political career are obviously primarily focused on re-election and on office seeking, and these goals are possible only acting in a well-defined way in order to gain the support of national parties (Faas 2003; Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; Strøm 2012). The high levels of cohesion that are noticed in the European party groups are explained by Hix et al. through the mechanism of delegation of organizational and leadership powers from the national parties to the European groups.

In this framework we can observe the first peculiarity of the European parliamentary class: the MEPs are the representatives of multiple
constituencies (Farrell and Scully 2003), with the need to act as European representatives without cutting off their ties with their national parties (Farrell and Scully 2007).

Beside these two different approaches, there is one certain empirical dimension: there is a group of supranational politicians that is involved in European issues and that follows specific patterns of career. The development of these different patterns seem to be the direct consequence of a European parliament that is no longer an institutional body mainly composed by amateur politicians: the professionalization of a European parliamentary class is the indicator of a certain degree of institutionalization of the EP and in the process of selection of the political class (Salvat 2012). In order to have proof about this professionalization's process, it is important to take a look at the origin of the euro politicians to understand if they have a strong political background or if they are amateur politicians for which Strasbourg represents the first important step in their political career. A better knowledge of the MEPs' patterns of career could help us to understand if we are facing the empowerment of a new class of supranational politicians, which means the enforcement of a core group of Euro politicians who concentrates its political activity in the EP. This does not mean that the political careers at the national and the supranational level are completely separated; indeed, according to the model of multilevel governance they are rather interconnected. If we think about the political professionalization as a pattern of concentric circles (Borchert 2003), it is possible to consider the supranational arena as the last ring of these concentric circles.

A great bulk of the literature that studies political careers have a too static perspective about this problem: they are particularly focused on the national legislatures and by this kind of approach it is really difficult to understand the type of relationship that exists between different institutions and various patterns of career (Borchert and Stolz 2011). As underlined by Borchert and Stolz, the career's patterns imply a certain degree of movement and for the great part of professional politicians the beginning of the career starts before the entry in the national legislatures, usually after a strong involvement in local politics. Furthermore, with the enforcement of the supranational arena, some careers start at local level, they reach the national legislatures and they move towards the European level.

The hypothesis is that in this framework there are some politicians who are linked with the national political dimension but act autonomously in the supranational arena, determining a new type of representation; the supranational representation (Farrell and Scully 2007). In this context the supranational representatives are characterized by a specific recruitment pattern, with MEPs that have a specific training, a past political experience and that are specifically involved with European issues.

The kind of politicians that arrive at Strasbourg are also influenced by the degree of attraction exerted by the EP: a strong and institutionalized parliament, with more powers, more resources and more opportunities to influence the EU policy making, representing a more attractive institution for professional politicians: the more the work conditions become regular and increase the power over the legislative process of a legislature, the more it becomes an interesting arena in which to serve (Polsby 1968; Salvati 2012; Daniel 2015). The institutional settings, in which MPs serve, provide a structure of ties and opportunities that influence the different patterns of career. As outlined before, more levels of government and a major number of institutions
increase the number of existing offices: so, a system of multilevel governance represents a great opportunity for professional politicians because it provides the chance to increase career mobility. In this framework, the European level becomes more and more interesting because it increases the number of available offices and because these offices have had a great expansion of power over the last twenty years of reforms. Concerning the structure of opportunities linked with the various institutional settings, Borchert detected three elements of these settings, which influence the patterns of career of the professional politicians (Borchert 2011, pp. 121-123):

1. Availability: the number of offices for which any candidate can compete;
2. Accessibility: how simple it is to obtain a certain office;
3. Attractiveness: the interest that the offices raise in professional politicians.

For what concerns the EU institutional setting, it is possible to outline some features about the three elements presented by Borchert (Borchert 2011):

1. Availability: the number of available political offices in the EU are essentially the seats in the EP, the commissioner offices, the president of the European Commission and the president of the European Council. These offices are fewer if compared to the ones available in the member states and could probably satisfy just the ambition of a core group of politicians. We could refer to this group with the label “political elite”, using the expression proposed by Von Beyme in order to detect the narrower group of decision makers in the party hierarchies (Von Beyme 1996, 151),
2. Accessibility: the seats in Strasbourg are easy to access for those politicians who have a strong support by their national party’s elite. For what concern the other offices, the conditions are even more complex because what matters is the national government support. So, it is correct to affirm that to reach a euro office is not a simple task, and it is probably more difficult compared to the national arena,
3. Attractiveness: over the last years the attractiveness of a seat in Strasbourg has strongly increased due to the empowerment of the EP (Beauvallet and Michon 2010; Salvati 2013).

So, if the structure of opportunities influences the chances of an advancement in career, and so does the individual ambition of the politicians, a complex structure of multilevel governance could be an incentive to try new patterns of career outside national borders (Borchert 2003; 2011). These movements take into account several elements like the costs and benefits involved in these political routes and can be summarized in three different patterns: a unilinear pattern, an alternative pattern with different career arenas attracting different contenders, and an integrated pattern that hasn’t a clear hierarchy between the various offices (Borchert 2003). With the recent development of regionalism and the enforcement of the supranational arena, it is difficult to say that the dominant pattern is the unilinear but it is more likely to be an up and down movement along the ladder of the political career; due to the empowerment of the regional and supranational offices, even the stop in one of these two levels has become an interesting opportunity for a successful political career (Stolz 2003). This kind of bidirectional movements from national and subnational fields to supranational (and vice versa) seem to replicate the structure of ties and opportunities that can be found in federal systems (Hubé and Verzichelli 2012).
3 A TYPOLOGY PROPOSAL FOR THE MEPS

In the literature devoted to the European parliamentary class, the typology attempts are mostly based upon the concept of ambition/motivation, a factor that is quite elusive compared both to the needs of the empirical research and to the explanatory capacity of the typology which derives from (Edinger and Fiers 2007; Scarrow 1997; Verzichelli and Edinger 2005). The ambition seems to be a too unstable element for our purpose because ambitions could change during time for multiple causes like the redefinition of interests/goals or the possibility of a new career. With this statement I don’t want to marginalize the impact of the individual ambitions but I have tried to define some limits useful to my empirical research. As written by Schlesinger “ambitions lies at the heart of politics” (Schlesinger 1966, 1), and this statement represents evidence that it is difficult to dispute. Professional politicians are ambitious and they fight to gain or keep an office or to advance to a higher position (Borchert 2011). Even Eulau paid great attention to the role of expectations in the political career and wrote that: “As a subjective experience a career is a developmental sequence of images which links past with present and future. A complete portrayal of political careers as subjective events include recollections of the past, orientations toward the present, and expectations concerning the future” (Eulau 1962, 74). But in this paper, the main need is to investigate more stable elements that can be used for the definition of a valuable typology of the different types of political career inside the EP: for this reason I decided to analyse the previous political career of the elected and the tenure as MEP, because they could provide a more objective instrument for the empirical analysis.

The first attempt to propose a classification of the MEP’s patterns of career has been made by Susan Scarrow. Her starting point is the consideration that every member of parliament is interested in working in a legislature that is strong and autonomous as much as possible; for this reason she believes that the classification of the MEPs is influenced by the fact that for single members the seat in Strasbourg can be a stepping stone position for a more successful national career or it represents a kind of political retirement (Scarrow 1997, p.254). Based on this proposition, she detects three possible patterns of career for the MEPs:

1. Stepping stone politicians: use their seat in Strasbourg to gain a national political office;
2. European careerists: those who have a primary commitment in the European affairs;
3. Political dead-end: those who stay briefly in the EP and will close their political career in Europe.

The results presented in Scarrow’s research underline how the EP in the ‘90s has started to exercise a certain attraction – thanks to the empowerment process of the European institutions – stimulating the development of a core group of MEPs devoted to the European political career. The conclusion made by Scarrow is interesting and particularly valuable considering it ex post: “This trend is likely to be self-reinforcing, because the greater the role that Parliament claims, the more likely it is to attract those with European interests” (Scarrow 1997, 261). The core idea is that the empowerment of the parliamentary arena is the main element, which is able to influence the political class to act as really European and fully committed on European issues.

Edinger and Fiers share Scarrow’s approach and they agree on the idea that the
political and institutional development of the EP has been the incentive of a more pro-European socialization of those members of the national elite that moved towards Strasbourg (Edinger and Fiers 2007). The implication of this development is first of all the possibility for a core group of politicians to shift their career goals from the national (or sub national) level to the supranational one that now represents an interesting career opportunity, so underlining an ever closer relationship between these two levels (Feron, Crowly and Giorgi 2007; Stolz 2001). The two authors present a typology of the European political careers that is mainly focused on the MEP's past political experience and on the ambitions/desires linked with the career positions. This typology gives us three groups of Euro representatives: who have never had a political position at the national level, who had a past political career in their home country and who gained a national political position only after an experience in the European institutions. Edinger and Fiers' typology is the result of the use of two different kinds of variables, one objective – the political career of the MEPs – and one more subjective, the single ambitions/preferences of the MEPs. This attempt of typology is extremely useful because it sheds a light on a very important issue for political science that is really difficult to define due to the peculiarities of the European political system. Having said this, it is important to underline some limits of this typology:

1. The difficulty to measure the eventual changes in the orientations/ambitions of the MEPs. The career ambitions can be variable, frequently not clear and they can be modified by the influence of different factors.

2. It does not pay much attention to the proper career paths of the EP. For example the attribution of the offices in the EP is influenced by the nationality of the MEPs, by the different degree of strength of the various groups and by the different power of the various national delegations in the European parliamentary groups.

Another attempt of typology is presented by Verzichelli and Edinger and is based on two dimensions: the first is represented by the MEPs expertise - distinguishing between specialized competences (linked to the local and European level) and general competences -, the second dimension is connected to the impact that the national political experience has on the development of a European career (Verzichelli and Edinger 2004). With this attempt the two authors try to outline some clear boundaries to define a European political class and they especially underline how the interconnections between the different levels of the political activity are becoming much stronger. Actually we are facing a real empowerment of a multilevel type of political career (Borchert and Stolz 2011; Feron, Crowly and Giorgi 2007; Stolz 2001), interconnected with the national level but characterized by an even higher level of autonomy.

The taxonomy proposed by Bale and Taggart (2005; 2006) is built on the concept of role orientation (or role cognition) and the way in which the parliamentarians' background and their personal interests influence the roles that they take during their parliamentary experience. According to Bale and Taggart role orientations “comprise patterns of beliefs, perhaps even narratives and self-perceptions that guide behavior” (Bale and Taggart 2005, 11), so the unit of analysis is the single parliamentarian and how he conceives his role and how he behaves according to that role conception. Furthermore these role orientations are influenced by what the individual MP intends to do when the parliamentary term is over, if he decides to stop his experience, to fight for a re-election or tries to improve his career. From this point of view the two authors present four types of role orientations: 1) the policy advocate, which is devoted to a limited set of issues and his satisfaction derives from legislative
achievement, 2) the constituency representative which is mainly focused on the relationship with his own constituency, 3) the European evangelist which is committed to the European integration project, 4) the institutionalist which see the EP as an end in itself. Finally there is a residual category that is the absentee. What emerges as the most interesting element of this taxonomy is the possibility to use these different types to control the change and the development in the MEPs' careers and the trajectories of the individual parliamentarians in the EP.

A similar analysis has been conducted by Navarro (2012) which derived from an in-depth interviews with some MEPs, four distinct role types. According to Navarro the study of roles could be particularly useful because it allows making in-depth studies about parliamentary representation beyond the simple analysis of voting behaviour. By this stream of research it is possible to study for what reasons a parliamentarian decides to act according to a well-defined role instead of another. These reasons could be found beyond the classical motivations linked to self-interests and utilitarian considerations but because at the base of this decision there is a set of norms and beliefs that make this choice the best for the individual. An actor decides to follow a specific pattern because he thinks that it is good and legitimate not only "on the basis of instrumental reasons but because his experience and knowledge make him believe that it is so" (Navarro 2012, 185). From this stream of research Navarro derives four role types, which could be found in the EP. In the first type we find the animators that are the MEPs which act to improve the European integration process and that are committed to enforce the political debate about the European future. The second one is the specialist and represents all the MEPs that are committed on the day-by-day decision making process and that "give priority to the technical and practical attributes of their position" (ibid., 190). The third is the intermediary who is mainly focused on improving the connection between electors and European institutions. The last one is the outsider and gathers all those MEPs that are unsatisfied with the European integration and with the functioning of the European institutions and want to manifest it as much as possible.

All these different attempts to build a typology stress different features of the (potential) European parliamentary class. Considering all these proposals we can affirm that they are all built with a mix of "objective" and "subjective" criterion. And it’s probably the large use of the second type of element that can create some problems for the use of the empirical data. Variables that are based on a predisposition, like the ones, which detect ambitions and expectations, are not always reliable like the variables that are built on acts that can be immediately observed. This is extremely important not only because there could be a difference between what is declared and what someone really thinks or believes, but mainly because ambitions and expectations can change suddenly and are always influenced by the transformation imposed by the reality. My attempt of typology tries to overcome these kinds of problems, using only objective elements; however I recognize that this choice can imply some costs about the richness and deepness of the analysis. Despite this consideration, I think that this kind of approach can be useful to inquire on the enforcing process of the European political class, providing quite a clear picture of how the actual political elite in Strasbourg is composed. Due to this choice it is possible to take a snapshot of the actual situation of the career patterns into the EP and if we were in presence of the enforcement of a European political class, we could have an interesting indicator to measure the institutionalization of the EP. By the means of this classification it is possible to understand how the chamber enforcement is proceeding instead of foreseeing the future trajectories.
of the MEPs’ personal careers (Polsby 1968; Cotta 1979). The stabilization of a core group of European politicians (associated with a turnover reduction) is an indicator of the EP’s strengthening and of its institutionalization (Cotta 1979; Whitaker 2014).

What is important to consider is that this typology is influenced by the main features of the arena that we are observing: first of all a context of multilevel governance links together different arenas, in which we can find professional politicians making the shift from one level to another a very credible option during the political career. The peculiarity of a multilevel political system lays on the opportunity to draw multiple career routes (connected with multiple activities): this framework provides a high degree of flexibility and a huge spectrum of chances. For this reason the political careers can benefit of vertical and horizontal shifts that make the political course less stable and defined compared to the one in the national context. Secondly we refer to a political framework in continuous evolution: the fact that the European integration hasn’t arrived at a conclusive stage, also means that the institutional structure is in movement with frequent changes in its organization and internal distribution of power.

So, for this proposal of typology, I have started from the previous political experience of the MEP: a first distinction between the concept of amateur politician and professional politician is useful. The case of the amateur politician is one who decides to enter in the political arena but hasn’t in his background a prior active militancy in a party and acquires his political knowledge during the parliamentary experience. The professional politician is one who considers politics as a normal work activity, with an entry from low political positions (local and party offices) and the creation of a curriculum that allows him to reach relevant offices; this path is normally structured by the training in the party or in the local administrations. Beyond the classical Weberian distinction between “who lives for politics and who lives off politics”, in analysing the concept of political professionalism Weber underlines how the emergence of the professional politicians in the legislatures is a function of the rationalization and specialization of the political activity.

If we look at the previous political experience of the elected in Strasbourg, we could distinguish between two levels of origin: the European and the national level. The MEP’s origin, associated with the parliamentary tenure, which defines the level of political professionalization, could influence the European political career of the deputy also for what concerns his bias towards the national or supranational political arena. This kind of typology could be seen as a useful path to define which route the deputies’ career in the EU could take: starting from the condition of “political novice”, it is possible to schematize the features of an eventual supranational political profession. From the MEP with a past political experience, we can outline the dichotomy, which divides the two most relevant types: the MEP with a prior experience in the EP and the deputy with a strong national political background.
This attempt of typology is essentially focused on two elements: the political background of the MEPs before their election and their parliamentary tenure. These two features influence another element, which characterizes the politician's career (both at the national and at the European level): the degree of specialization. With the term specialization we mean the ability to cope with all the features of parliamentary life (knowledge of rules of procedure, work in commission, party group work...) and the skills developed in some subfields (environment, institutional reforms, foreign affairs...). As sketched before, these elements allow us to analyse types that even if are not totally exhaustive for the supranational parliamentary reality, permit to define with a certain empirical precision some career paths within the EP. These are the types’ features:

1. European politician. In this category are all the MEPs that are re-elected in the EP. I consider an MEP as a European professional if he/she has spent at least an entire legislature in Strasbourg, independently by the fact that he/she has been reconfirmed in the seat or has come back after an interval. It’s not important if before the arrival at the EP the deputy had a more or less relevant experience in the national politics; what is essential is that thanks to the European tenure he/she has presumably gained a deep knowledge of the supranational politics and of the functioning of the EP;

2. Amateur. In this category are all the MEPs that arrive at the EP without a political background; for them Strasbourg represents the first step of the political career. Here we find those who had a prior active militancy in a party but never reached an institutional office (both at national and local level) or a relevant position in the party organization (both at national and local level). In this category there are also those MEPs that haven’t a clear political background but have a successful extra-political career which grant them popularity; they are chosen by the parties for their non-political fame. Here we consider intellectuals, famous journalists, opinion leaders, and personalities of culture and sport;

3. National politician. In this category are all the MEPs that have a well-established career at the national or subnational level; we consider those who hold both an office in the national institutions and/or those who hold an important office in their own political parties.

By means of this typology I have tried to outline some different paths in the development of a political–parliamentary career, with the aim to understand if and how there is a strengthening process of a stable core of MEPs. Now I’ll present and analyse the empirical data referred to the 7th parliamentary term.
4 The analysis of the career during the 7th parliament

The empirical research is based on the study of the political biographies of the MEPs, limited to the 7th parliament: this choice is due to the opportunity to study the deputies of the ten states which became members in 2004. With this choice I think that it is possible to gain a good picture of the actual situation concerning the strengthening of the European parliamentary class and so make a first useful step towards deeper studies concerning the progress in the EP internal institutionalization. The presented data is all primary sources collected by the author analysing the single biographies of the MEPs present on the EP's website and integrated, where possible, with the personal website of the single MEPs in order to cope with the problem of information deficiencies in some of the personal deputies EP's page (the percentage of personal websites that I have consulted is around 40% of the total).

To establish if an MEP is part of the national politician type, I've considered all the relevant political offices at national and subnational level (national deputies, ministers, junior ministers, regional deputies, mayor) which I consider equivalent due to the increasing importance of the subnational level in a system of multilevel governance (this is not totally true for some of the eastern countries that still have highly centralized political systems), both in the institutions and in the parties (the party's offices considered are general and regional secretaries, members of the national and regional bureaus). Concerning the amateur category, I’ve considered the deputies that arrived in Strasbourg after a relevant extra political career, and that provided them considerable success and visibility in their home country (intellectuals, famous journalists, opinion leaders, and personalities of culture and sport) and the deputies which had a past political experience but that could not be labelled as professionals.

Looking at the data concerning the distribution of the MEPs in the three different categories (1), we discover that in 2009/2014 parliamentary term the number of the European politicians is consistent, covering 50% of the whole MEPs: in the 7th parliament half of the MEPs had a past experience in the EP. This data means that the parties, which compete in the European arena, prefer to have in Strasbourg not only expert politicians, but politicians that have gained precise skills in European affairs. Even more interesting is the distribution of the elected in the remaining categories; it is from this data that we can understand how the newly elected MEPs have or not a strong political background.

Table 1: Careers classification in the 7th parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European politician</th>
<th>Amateur</th>
<th>National politician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49.9% 1</td>
<td>21.5% 2</td>
<td>28.6% 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The values of type 2 and 3 allows us to draw a first conclusion: the prevalence of type 3 (28.6%) in the 2009 elections means that parties decided to indicate for the new nominations candidates with a strong political career and a good anchorage in the national politics. The other relevant aspect is the extremely high number of deputies with a consistent experience as MEP or as national politician: 78.5% of the total suggests that after some legislatures have been abandoned the kind of political recruitment based on the prevailing presence of elected without a past political experience, represented by the category that I labelled as amateur (Norris and Franklin 1997; Norris 1999). These elements
confirm that the EP is becoming an even more highly professionalized legislature, and that the election in the EP represents an interesting step in the political career of professional politicians (Feron, Crowly and Giorgi 2007). The high rate of type 1, the European politician, underlines that we are facing a real enforcing process of a class of European politicians, devoted to the European issues and more specialized in the supranational affairs (Beauvallet and Michon 2010). It is important to specify that a relevant experience in the national arena is not an obstacle to develop strong pro – European feelings; as demonstrated by Franklin and Scarrow, the MEPs’ involvement in the EP’s development and the integration process grows for two main reasons (Katz and Wessels 1999): a) the interest in the strengthening of the institution to which deputies belong to, b) a specific socializing power of the EP which operates in the first months of office and that shape a full commitment of the newcomers in the institution's life (Scully 2005). In 2009–2014, the MEPs are for the great part professional politicians (78.5%); if we are reaching a good level of specialization for a core number of purely MEPs (49.9%), we have also the evidence that the great part of the newcomers of the 7th parliament are elected with a relevant past political experience and this means that: a) parties prefer to rely on qualified staff and not on “political apprentices”, b) the EP is becoming a more interesting political arrival for the professional politicians in the member states.

At this point it could be useful to disaggregate the data of our classification, to understand if and how there are some variations between different sets of countries: for this reason I decided to divide the analysis using the European membership as the main criterion, splitting the fifteen countries of the longest membership from the twelve new access countries of 2004 and 2007. According to the results shown in Table 2, the data of the European politicians in the EU15 are quite similar to the EU27: the most relevant difference concerns the number of amateurs that are more consistent if compared to the level of the EU at 27.

This means that in the oldest fifteen members, there is a major willingness to consider Strasbourg as a useful step for those who start their political career. It’s possible to suppose, according to Franklin and Scarrow, that in these countries the highest number of beginners are favoured by the longest membership in the EU, which make these countries more socialized with the presence of a supranational political dimension. This idea copes with Borchert’s suggestion to consider political professionalization as a pattern of concentric circles (Borchert 2003), thinking of the supranational arena as a possible and natural point of entry for the political career. It is interesting to note Greece's case in which the most prominent category is the amateur one with a striking 40.9%. This data reveals that there is not only a high turnover rate which makes difficult to establish a core group of European politicians, but also that Greek national politicians probably don't see Strasbourg as an interesting step in their career and prefer the national arena. Totally different to Greece are U.K., Germany, Belgium and Ireland that have a high number of European politicians, showing how in these countries it is considered fundamental a strong specialization level for European professionals in order to deal with the complicated European issues. Furthermore the results of these countries also reflect the structure of their own political systems in which the turnover rate is lower compared to the one of countries like Italy, Portugal or France (Matland and Studlar 2004; Manow 2007).

Looking at the four biggest and most important countries – France, Germany, Italy and U.K. – that participated to all the European elections we can underline some interesting elements. First of all U.K and Germany, which have a solid core group of European politicians (the U.K. obtained the highest rate in this type),
substantially higher than France and Italy. Apparently we could exclude that the level of national involvement in the European integration process could influence the predisposition to see the seat in Strasbourg as an autonomous target to which devote attention to: on one hand a Euro sceptic country as the U.K. has a very low turnover on the other hand Italy, that traditionally is a great supporter of integration, has a high turnover level. Italy and France, among the biggest countries, are empowering a European political class with more difficulties. Italy has one of the lowest rate of persistence and one of the highest for the presence of newcomers with a previous national political experience (this data follows the same trend for all the countries with a weak European political class). This means that Strasbourg represents just a step in the political career, probably while waiting for a new office in the home country: in Italy – and in the other countries with this turnover level – we are facing a high level of elite circulation that makes the stabilization of a core group of European politicians more difficult.

**Table 2: Careers classification in the 7th Parliament according to the country provenience (EU 15)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European politician</th>
<th>Amateur</th>
<th>National politician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total EU 15</strong></td>
<td><strong>50%</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For what concerns the results by the twelve new member states, if the average of the type of European politician is quite the same as the oldest members of the EU, it is possible to observe a very low rate of amateurs coming from the new access countries. This implies that the parties in the new member states choose to indicate nominees with a solid political experience, which are able to act in the new political arena. For the MEPs of the new access countries a previous involvement in parliamentary or governmental offices seems to be a relevant factor for a subsequent arrival at the EP; this condition is similar to the one of the first elected at the EP (with the EEC at nine) where a past experience as MNP was fundamental for the arrival in Strasbourg. This similarity is confirmed also by Corbett and others (2007) which measured that of the newly elected in the EP in the 2004 European elections from the new member states, 57% had a previous political experience as MNPs and 19.1% as cabinet ministers. The low level of amateurs can be interpreted as the best way to protect the interests of the new member states in a very complex and demanding institutional context as the supranational one.

The great bulk of the elected from the eastern countries have a solid political experience in a proportion that is even higher compared to the oldest fifteen members. This means that there is a certain convergence in the actual selection process of the euro elites and furthermore that there is quite a strong core
group of euro politicians that is actually enforcing in the eastern countries. It will be interesting, for a future research, to monitor if this process will be enforced in the next European elections or if it will be weakened by the rise of a strong anti-euro elite in Eastern Europe.

**Table 3: careers classification in the 7th parliament according to the country provenience (12 new ACC.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>European politician</th>
<th>Amateur</th>
<th>National politician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot 12 new acc. (2004 and 2007)</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5 Conclusion**

The study of political careers allows us to have a deeper knowledge of the professionalization of the political class and can provide some important insights into political institutions, on how they work and to what degree they are institutionalized (Hibbing 1999; Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012a; Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012b). Studying the political careers is fundamental because it gives a better knowledge of institutions and it enlightens the structure of ties and opportunities in which these careers take place. As outlined by Borchert, when we study political careers we find some patterns that are independent from the individual preferences and that are linked with the institutional structure (Borchert 2011).

This proposal of typology allows highlighting some interesting points, both for a better knowledge of the 2009–2014 EP’s composition and for future stream of research concerning the European political class. The first part of the data concerning the composition of the 7th EP shows how strong the presence of career politicians (both European professionals and national professionals) is. This data can be the result of the empowerment of the EP, which has occurred in the last twenty years: this legislature obviously is no longer the amateur body described by Norris (Norris 1999), but it is becoming an even more powerful co-legislator in the European political arena. The institutional structure of opportunities has made the EP a more interesting institution in which to serve in, confirming that the parliament is going through a relevant institutionalization process which will make an even stronger institutional player in the future due to its cohesion and adaptability (Huntington 1968).

Looking at the disaggregate data, it is interesting to note how high is the rate of professional politicians in the ten new access countries. One possible interpretation is the need for these states to strongly protect their interests against the other states; sensible to the public opinion of their home countries, the deputies from eastern countries can be less inclined to embrace the idea of a
strong devolution of powers to the European Union. The future development of a European political class from eastern countries is an interesting element that deserves more attention; it will be important to set a research agenda focused on the behaviour of the eastern MEPs.

The main data that I want to stress is that the evidence presented here, shows how the EP is attracting politicians that decide to serve long European careers, and that the great part of the newcomers that were elected in the 2009 elections, have a previous strong political experience. This underlines how the EP is becoming an attractive institution in which to work in; the greater the role of the EP, the easier it is to attract politicians with European interests or with a professional career. This also explains the increasing ability of the EP to face – and sometimes win – the challenges against the other European institutions.

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Comparative Analysis of the Political Management Dimensions of Local Election Campaigns

Domen KOS

Political management of local election campaigns is the central topic of this article, which presents a wide range of factors and components of the local election campaigns, which will be called dimensions in order to unify the terminology. All dimensions are connected on the basis of the strategic dimension of political management. The dimensions are set through theoretical and empirical findings of authors from diverse environments. Different experiences indicate various dimensions of local election campaigns (normative and systemic, political and environmental, geographical and demographical, organizational and executive, strategic, and the dimensions of sources, interaction, candidate, time, and intensity). All these fundamental dimensions consist of a different number of sub-dimensions. Depending on the environment of the study, they are extremely diverse in meaning. The synthesis of international theoretical and empirical findings can be found in the form of a newly established analytical framework for the exploration of local election campaigns. With the appropriate adjustments to the different contexts of each country, this framework can also be used in the international arena in the field of directly elected representatives of the local self-government authorities. The article closes with a discussion about the empirical testing of the established analytical framework.

Key words: political management; local elections; local election campaign; dimensions; analytical framework.

1 Introduction: Political Management of Election Campaigns

The topic of the article represents one of the basic questions in democratic political systems, because the “elections are among the most interesting and important political events in the life of a country. Even non-democratical...
governments reinforce the value of elections by routinely using them to justify a regime's existence" (Medvic 2014, 1). Within the context of rational-legal authority Weber (1962) recognizes the meaning of legitimization of power through clear rules, laws, and regulations. These are defined by the law (Kranjc 2010) and more thoroughly in the context of election campaigns with the principles of the election system (Grad 2004). Elections are an essential part of the fight for political power, while the election campaigns supposedly give meaning to these fights (Herrnson and Campbell 2009). These can be further examined through Schumpeter's (1942) concept of fighting for political power with an election race (election campaign) and with the election results. Elections can therefore be understood as legitimization of receiving and asserting political power. Election campaigns are important because they offer the voters' active participation, an information-based selection of representatives, and a satisfaction of interests. Together with elections, campaigns also provide legitimization of the elected candidate and public policies (Trent et al. 2011).

Election campaigns are a frequently discussed topic within social sciences, specifically in the field of political science and communication studies. Nevertheless there are different definitions of an election campaign that vary due to its complexity. Terminological definition is offered by Safire (1993) in his political dictionary. He explains that the term is taken from military jargon and was later used in a political context in England as the idea that politics is a form of combat. Schumpeter (1942) defines election campaign as an activity connected to a power struggle. Election campaign is also defined as a political activity of opposing political actors, taking place during elections with the goal of achieving a higher number of votes through systematic and organization-based process of informing, convincing, and mobilising the voters (Norris 2002; Schmitt-Beck and Farrell 2002). Agranoff (1976, 3) defines election campaigns as a process of (political) management that “coordinates effort to achieve objectives, such as electing a candidate to office, connect various operations that organize and use environmental, human, social and material resources”. Mutually complementing definitions offer the best attempt to define election campaigns.

Political management mainly applies to the field of applied political science. The interest in studying political management is increasing due to the process of professionalization of politics, while its role in academic institutions around the world is becoming very important (Johnson 2009a). In the field of political management authors most frequently place management of election campaigns, political counselling, political marketing, researching the competition, lobbying and advocacy, funding, public opinion polling, and other forms of applied knowledge in the political processes (Herrnson 2005; Johnson 2009a; Burton and Shea 2010). The historical beginnings of political management could more broadly be defined through the beginnings of the Western political thought and parallel to Almond’s (1996) rising curve of the Western political thought. Furthermore, we must also mention the important contribution of Machiavelli's political thought; in his work Il Principe he produced one of the first political manuals for rulers (Machiavelli 1966; Alatri 1980). Harris, Lock, and Rees (2000) place the aforementioned manual in analogy with modern political management. In a more narrow sense, the American political scientist Johnson (2009b) states that political management has primarily evolved in the 1930s in the field of political counselling in local election campaigns in the United States of America (with the establishment of the first company of the kind, called "Campaigns, Inc."). This is supposedly the way the market was presented with a new market sector, which has undergone major growth until today.
The interest in local election campaigns arose no earlier than in the 1980s. The reasons for the previous lack of interest can be found in the opinions about irrelevance, the perception of smallness in comparison with the national election campaigns, and the opinion about the weak link between the election campaign on a local level and its effects. Furthermore, local election campaigns were supposedly seen as extremely complex in nature and difficult to define (Carty and Eagles 2000; Carty et al. 2003). The interest arose through research of election campaigns on the national level and it was not until later that it developed into its own research question (Maarek 1995; Carty and Eagles 2000; Ware 2003). The arguments for the importance of researching local election campaigns can also be found in the historical context, which is seen in the ideal postmodern evolutionary model of the election campaign, where the election campaign returns on a local level (Norris 2002).

Resulting from the addressed issues of researching local election campaigns, this article explores local election campaigns as an independent research question in the field of political science. Through theoretical and empirical research questions authors indicate various components, factors, aspects, and other descriptions of the influences of the election campaigns, which will be called dimensions in order to unify the terminology. This unified term is used by various authors (Carty and Eagles 2000; Carty et al.; Fridkin and Kenney 2008; Olesen 2011). Here we can mainly detect researches of individual dimensions, their proportion and effects, or the connections of certain dimensions. The main shortcoming, addressed in this article, lies in an analytical framework and a complete identification and definition of the dimensions of local election campaigns. This type of void is especially felt in the research of local election campaigns in Slovenia, which are poorly researched in their dimensions.

First part of this article is prepared as an introduction to elections, election campaigns, political management and addressed issues of this article itself. Second part is about the evolution of election campaigns and campaigning. Third part starts with local election campaigns and carries on with theoretical and empirical findings of authors from different environments. All dimensions are connected on the basis of the strategic dimension of political management. Fourth part of the article establishes the strategic analytical framework of contemporary local election campaigns and synthesizes its political management dimensions. The article closes with a discussion about the empirical testing of the established analytical framework.

2 The evolution of election campaigns and campaigning

As we could see above, it is difficult to construct a definition due to the always-changing environment, organizers of the election campaigns, communication channels, and the effects of the election campaign. Besides that, the election campaigns have noticeably progressed in the last decades. The reasons for the progress or the evolution of election campaigns can be found in the television, information, and communications revolution, as well as in the political progress (Farrell 1996; Norris 2002). Of particular interest is Norris’ typology (2002), which introduces three ideal types of models of evolution: pre-modern, modern, and postmodern election campaign.
A pre-modern election campaign is a campaign in its primary version. The organizers of an election campaign are the political parties or, more precisely, the party leadership, which is in contact with the voters on a local level. This way, the communication between the candidates and the electorate is predominantly direct through field activities, which are not planned long-term. One of the main characteristics of a pre-modern election campaign is an extremely loyal electorate, which gets its information through party newsletters and media. These are connected to the respective political party. A modern election campaign makes a leap from a local to a distinctly national level, with the help of the revolution of television. Television also became the central tool of a one-sided communication. With the transfer of the election campaign on a national level we can also observe the division of the electorate and the political parties and the breakaway from the loyalty to political parties, which is characteristic of pre-modern election campaigns (Norris 2002). The main difference occurs with the performers of an election campaign, meaning partial professionalization with external advisors from the field of political counselling, public relations, public opinion, and others (Plasser 2001). These mainly represent support and professional help, while political parties are the ones that centrally coordinate election campaigns. Postmodern election campaigns are the last phase in the development or the evolution of election campaigns. They are characterised by a permanent election campaign, which means a campaign that never ends and goes on the entire time during the election cycles (Mann and Ornstein 2000; Norris 2002). Another main characteristic is the act of relocalization of the election campaign or, in other words, the act of coming back to a local environment, closer to the electorate. The consequence is the use of manifold local communication channels, mostly the use of local media. Furthermore, the postmodern election campaign became drastically more complex than the previous forms since it is characterised by informational and communicational revolution. Both technological revolutions bring the possibility of addressing different electorates and target audiences, as well as a two-sided communication, which is not possible with television. Different profiles of experts play an important part in election campaigns due to the complexity and the aforementioned diversity of the postmodern election campaign (Norris 2002).

From an academic and research point of view, as well as from the point of view of the market sector of political management, it is clear that the election campaign has progressed in the last decades (some authors describe it as having become more ‘sophisticated’). This brings certain negative as well as positive consequences for democracy (Farrell 1996; Norris 2002). Field activities still represent an important and predominant role despite the acceptance of communications technology, which is especially true for election campaigns on a local level. We are not talking about replacing personal interaction with the voters, but about promoting political rhetoric through other channels. The positive effects can be seen not only in a better-informed environment, but also mostly in expanding the circle of citizens who receive the political information. At the same time this helps improve the quality of political rhetoric. Besides the positive and beneficent effects there remain the alarming negative effects of the development of the election campaign, originating in the increase of financial resources, intended for the executives of the election campaign. Consequently, this represents a starting advantage for all those who enter the election campaign from the incumbent position (using internal sources) as well as for all those with a higher social status. Furthermore, the political competitors are becoming more and more dependent on various interest groups that help finance the election campaigns. All of this brings uneven starting opportunities in the election campaign and also dependence on
the interest groups. It is difficult to put on the scale the positive and negative consequences since the trend is alarming from the point of view of democracy. Many academics, as well as many candidates, support redefining the mentality and turning back to traditional election campaigns, but it is difficult to expect this since the sophistication of the election campaigns remains an extremely progressive and irreversible trend (Strachan 2003).

Despite all the significance, wide range, and wastefulness of election campaigns, the scientific and research efforts of academics and researchers, and the lucratively of the market sector, it is interesting that there is no proven influence of election campaigns on the result of the elections. Here we should keep in mind the diverse opinions of approaches and schools dealing with this question. All different approaches come together in one point (Carmines and Huckfeldt 1996); election campaigns affect the result of the elections at least in some way. We cannot look at an election campaign solely through the prism of its activities and strategies; we have to observe it from a wider point of view, taking into account also the uncontrolled events, activities, and coincidences (Schmitt-Beck and Farrell 2002; Gosnell 1950).

3 LOCAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND ESTABLISHED DIMENSIONS WITH THEIR LINKS TO CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES

The development and professionalization of an election campaign can also be seen on a local level where the election campaign is no longer entirely based on field activities and direct personal approach. Specialized and financially more demanding communication techniques are used alongside the traditional ones. This means that the traditional techniques are not disappearing but are complemented with modern techniques of election campaigns. In addition, in local election campaigns, as well as in national ones, there is a real horse race going on with the new techniques of the election campaigns. The arms race progressively continues due to the trend toward professionalization, meaning that whenever one of the candidates uses a new technique or tool, others quickly follow because they cannot afford to be left behind in the election race (Moncrieff and Squire 2005).

On an international and Slovenian level, national election campaigns are better researched than local election campaigns. Politics on a local level, when opposed to politics on a national level, are seen as less important. It is with the exploration and opening of processes on a local level that politics on a local level are put in the foreground (Brezovšek 2004). With this it is given its own space that it deserves, characterised by accessibility, openness to integration, and direct participation of citizens in the issues (Brezovšek 2005). Based on this, we can claim that elections and with it the election campaigns on a local level perform a key role in the preservation of democracy. The elected representatives are given the authority to make decisions in the name of the nation. It is the frequency of elections that also guarantees the sovereignty of the people on a local level (Strachan 2003; de Tocqueville 1969). The meaning of the research of election trends and election campaigns on a local level is supported with the following additional arguments: more representatives of the people are elected on a local level in comparison with the national level; everyday decisions of local authorities are less exposed in the media than the decisions on a national level, yet all decisions play an important part in the lives of the citizens; local and national politics do not happen in a vacuum and that is why the events on a local level significantly affect the events on a national level.
and the other way around; local political life sees more direct personal interaction; an election campaign on a local level has a different course and, even with the use of the same techniques, has different effects than an election campaign on a national level (Strachan 2003). In order to prepare strategic analytical framework and synthesis of dimensions, we must first look at theoretical and empirical findings of authors from different environments.

Norris (2002) presents an interesting model that focuses on the communication in election campaigns. She lists the following key factors in the preparation and execution of the strategies in an election campaign (which also apply to local election campaigns): the legal system (electoral system, type of election, other normative definitions of an election campaign); the structure of mass media (with dilemmas such as ownership, control, its own management, and democracy, see Jones 2005; Foster 2010); the organizers of the election campaign (political parties, interest groups); different channels of communication and effects of campaign messages on the target audience (public opinion, political expertise, political relations, political behaviour). Each system works in (political) environment, which determinates it. The lines are fluid (Easton 1957).

Ware (1996) presents four basic types of interaction between the transmitter and the recipient in the context of communication as a central process in all election campaigns: intensive direct contacts (discussion in a circle of acquaintances); non-intensive methods of direct approach (discussion in the context of an election campaign in the field); impersonal interaction (printed advertisements of the election campaign and print media); and indirect interaction (electronic media and radio). Communication at the beginning of the campaign is especially important for a local election campaign since there is less variety of media and sources of information on a local level. In larger political arenas there exists a variety of media that serves as source of information about the candidate and the programme (Strachan 2003).

Whiteley and Seyd (2002) present numerous other factors of an election campaign, such as geographic location, closeness to the electoral competition, organization of local political parties, and the calibre and motivation of the candidate. The following factors are of special importance when taking into account the candidate: personality, the ability to communicate well, leadership skills, professional competence, appearance, and personality traits (Vreg 2004). To this we must also add political skills and background and we must not forget the interest in acting for the social good (Krašovec 2007). Special attention is given to the dilemma of electability of partisan and non-partisan candidates and ballots on a local level (Gilbert 1962). Here we must pose the question whether non-partisan candidates truly are non-partisan, since it has been discovered that they are mostly candidates that were on previous elections connected to one party or another (Haček and Kukovič 2011). However, according to Burton and Shea (2010), the differences between perception and reality bear little meaning.

Whiteley and Seyd (2002) also systemised the process of preparing and executing an election campaign from two different points of view; from the point of view of time, where they present a long-term or permanent election campaign (Mann and Ornstein 2000), a medium-term election campaign, and a short-term election campaign; and from the point of view of organization, where they deal with an election campaign that is centrally organized, centrally coordinated, and locally organized, with the latter supposedly being the most efficient (Clark 2012).
An important part of election campaigns on a local level is their starting point. Here we are talking about the potential advantages and disadvantages, brought about by candidacy from the position of the incumbent or candidacy from the position of the challenger. The advantage of incumbents is mostly the availability of financial and staff resources, with which they solve problems of the local community and, with it, maintain their recognition and popularity. Financial and staff resources also help them with the use of more sophisticated methods of communication (access to new technology and media) (Strachan 2003; Moncrieft and Squire 2005). Disadvantages of candidacy from the position of the incumbent are mostly seen in possible past decisions, which may be exploited for the purpose of a negative election campaign. Often the voters blame current political representatives for all the problems of a certain environment, even when it was beyond the power of the candidate to change them. A disadvantage is also the time constraint of the candidate, running from the position of the incumbent, because he must take care of the activities connected to his function and the activities of the election campaign – or at least give such an appearance. The candidates who candidate from the position of the incumbent are also subject to greater control and expectation from the side of the media (Trent et al. 2011).

We should not neglect the intensity of election campaigns, which depends on numerous factors, most of all on the candidate’s characteristics (especially vulnerability of the candidate who candidates from the position of the incumbent), the political environment, and the invested resources (Sulkin 2001). A case of local election campaigns in Canada showed that the possibility of relative predictions about the election results brings significantly less intensive election campaigns (Carty and Eagles 2000). Here we must add that in less competitive environments more traditional methods of election campaigns are used, while competitive environments demand the use of more sophisticated methods, which require more resources (Strachan 2003). Also important are the trends that significantly affect election campaigns on a local level, for example the perception of the economic situation, the popularity of the president, etcetera. The local level does not occur in a vacuum (Whiteley and Seyd 2002; Burton and Shea 2010). In the context of political environment Carty and Eagles (2000) warn about the importance of socio-demographic factors (for example urban or rural environment, number of inhabitants, and others).

An important factor in all election campaigns is the staffing of the performers of election campaigns, seen through the process of the aforementioned professionalization of election campaigns. The execution of an election campaign can be done within a party or individually; semi-professionally, with political parties at the centre, in cooperation with outsourcers; and professionally, characterised by equal role of political parties and outsourcers (Pitchell 1958; Farrell 1996; Plasser 2001; Norris 2002). The costs of political campaigns are also associated with this. According to multiple studies, the costs have lately drastically increased because of the professionalization of election campaigns. Consequently, this brings advantages to the candidates with a better financial starting point (Strachan 2003; Hetherington and Keefe 2007; Panagopoulos and Wielhouwer 2008). Besides the already mentioned financial resources, which play an extremely significant part in election campaigns of larger countries (as an example Wilcox (2005) stresses the election campaigns in the United States of America), staff resources are especially important. Next to the aforesaid candidates and professionals for election campaigns, staff resources comprise mostly of all the participants in an election campaign. Here we can find members of local parties, volunteers, family members, friends, and
other supporters, as well as various groups and organizations in the local environment. It is vital that all the participants are educated (party professionalised) in the execution of election campaigns; otherwise their contribution is meagre. Mere numerousness does not ensure effectiveness in the context of local election campaigns (Deutchman 1966; Christensen and Hogen-Esch 2006).

Opinions of authors differ when it comes to the importance of the contents of an election campaign. According to some, contents are losing their purpose, while others claim that the election contents still remain an important part of election campaigns (Norris 1998; Kustec Lipicer 2010). However, we most certainly cannot neglect the election programmes and contents of an election campaign and their role in election campaigns. Kustec Lipicer (2010) talks about public policy contents as a piece of the mosaic of election campaigns and a factor in the framework of election campaigns. With the goal of avoiding the banality of the contents of political campaigns, she focuses on exploring various politically ideological points of view and concrete public policy contents, offered by all the involved groups of an election campaign. In a local environment the latter could, for example, be depicted with the regulation of the local infrastructure, which is often identified in local contents of an election campaign.

All of the above is connected together by the strategy of an election campaign or the planning of an election campaign, which is, according to some authors, the most important element of political management of election campaigns; it divides responsibility, integrates work, and predicts the basic phases of an election campaign (Christensen and Hogen-Esch 2006; Burton and Shea 2010). The strategy also directs the manner of political communication and is perceived as basic knowledge of all political managers or consultants (Napolitan 1972). For example, the advertisements for an election campaign usually present the candidate’s capability, personality, and ideas for the future. That can be characterized as a positive election campaign. Negative election campaign transforms campaigning almost into a real sport spectacle, which is on the one hand interesting for undecided voters, but on the other negative campaign tends to deter interest in politics (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). Besides that, there are other mixed approaches between positive and negative campaign (Faucheux 1998). According to the strategic political communication of election campaigns, campaign theme and message must also be developed. It presents to voters a choice based on clear, simplified, believable and real candidate differences (Faucheux 1998). The strategy of an election campaign also defines the orientation of an election campaign, which can be oriented towards the party, towards the candidate or towards the candidate with the support of different interest groups and organizations (Herrmon 2005). An important strategic moment is unquestionably the pre-election integration of various parties, as well as various candidates, which is a relatively common and known occurrence in Europe (Gonder 2006). In hopes of winning the elections and later gaining power to rule and control the acceptance and implementation of local politics, different types of coalitions are formed in some local communities in the period before the elections (Haček et al. 2008). The importance of using research tools for the preparation of strategies, necessary for locating, collecting, and organizing information, is increasing during the time of sophisticated election campaigns (Harris 1957; Gaby and Treusch 1976).
4 Strategic framework of contemporary election campaigns: synthesis of dimensions

Diagram 1 presents the attempt of systematic identification of the dimensions of a local election campaign, according to the set objectives, uniformly adjusted to the terminological starting points, and the synthesis of the above mentioned theoretically-empirical findings of various authors. The diagram is set on the basis of a strategic dimension as a connecting dimension of political management of election campaigns, with the understanding of intertwined dimensions. Besides that, the diagram 1 also depicts the start of filling the research void that exists in this field.

Diagram 1: Diagram of the dimensions of a local election campaign

The diagram of a local election campaign portrays nine established dimensions that encompass different parts of local election campaigns. All these fundamental dimensions consist of a different number of sub-dimensions. The normative and systemic dimension defines all the normative regulations of the system of the election campaign and elections. Concretely, we are talking about the definitions of the electoral system, the type of elections, and the execution of the election campaign. The politically-environmental dimension defines the starting point of the election campaign (candidacy from the position of the incumbent, candidacy from the position of the challenger); the competitiveness of the environment and the predictability of election results; the structure and culture of the media system; socio-demographic factors; the content of the election campaign, and general trends. The geographically-demographic dimension defines the geographical characteristics of the environment. In the context of this dimension, geographic location, geographic fracture (to cities, settlements, villages, and quarters), and the closeness to the election race take the central role. The size of the election unit is also an important factor (based on the criteria of the number of inhabitants). The dimension of the candidate defines the candidate as a personality with certain skills, competence, appearance, and with personal traits, interests, and motivation. This dimension also encompasses the categorization of a non-partisan or partisan candidate. The dimension of time and intensity defines the timeline of the execution of the election campaign, which can be long-term or permanent, medium-term, and short-term. It also defines different levels of intensity of the election campaign, which changes according to various factors.
The organizational and executive dimension defines the organization of the election campaign, which can be centrally organized, centrally coordinated, or locally organized; the execution of the election campaign, which can be partisan or individual, semi-professional (central are political parties that work with outsources) or professional (equal role of political parties and outsourcers); and the level of organization of local (partisan) organizations. The dimension of resources defines all the resources of an election campaign, which can be financial, staff-related, or political. The financial sources are represented by financial means; the staff resources are represented by the available human capital; and the political resources are represented by the possibility of connecting with different local groups, civil society organizations, and political organizations. The dimension of interaction defines the communication between the transmitter and the recipient through indirect and direct channels of communication. The dimensions of interaction are the following: intensive direct contact, non-intensive methods of direct approach, impersonal interaction, and indirect interaction. Especially important is the primary interaction of the election campaign. The strategic dimension defines the connection of all the aforementioned dimensions in separate phases and ensures the effectiveness of political management of election campaigns, with the understanding of flexibility. The dimension dictates the use of positive and negative campaign strategies, as well as strategies of mixed approach; directs the political connections before the time of the election; develops the election campaign theme and message; orients the election campaign towards the party, the candidate or candidates, with the support of different interest groups and organizations; and directs the use of research tools for the preparation of a strategy.

5 Conclusion

The field of political management of election campaigns is one of the most interesting and among the fastest developing fields of political science by international as well as European standards. The professionalization in politics is giving prominence to political management even in academic institutions (Johnson 2009a). In Slovenian election campaigns we can identify the pre-modern or modern form of professionalization, which is also evident in the specific case of European elections in the years 2004 and 2009 (Deželan et al. 2010). We can logically conclude that the consequences of the less intense evolution and consequently less prominent professionalization of Slovenian election campaigns are visible in the fact that there is less interest for the research of the field of political management of election campaigns in Slovenia. This thesis is also confirmed by a literature review on the topic. This article offers a systematic introduction into the research of the field of local election campaigns in Slovenia since it systematically identifies the dimensions of a local election campaign and later establishes an analytical framework for the research of local election campaigns. The latter can also be used in international arena, with adequate adjustments to the context.

When put together, individual identified dimensions present different parts of local election campaigns, which are emphasized by various authors on the basis of their theoretical and empirical findings. Here we must point out that authors have different conceptions of the meaning of individual dimensions and their content since they explore them from different positions and use different approaches. Furthermore, the environment of their researches also differs. Theoretical and empirical findings of authors often research individual
dimensions in great depth, while disregarding others and believing them to be less prominent. The established analytical framework, however, does not focus on the meaning of individual dimensions in local election campaigns, but represents a unified and uniform scheme on the basis of the connecting strategic dimension of political management. The identified dimensions, connected together in the analytical framework, enable a basic starting point for empirical research.

The main limitation of empirical research can be found in the election campaigns themselves since they represent a complex, fluid, and changeable phenomenon. This is especially true for local election campaigns, which are generally carried out in smaller environments where the contacts are direct, accessible, and open. Besides that, a local election campaign never occurs in a vacuum of time and space, but is a part of miscellaneous subjective and objective factors. That is why this type of research of local election campaigns is a singular methodological challenge that requires a combination of research methods and techniques since they offer the best understanding of the research problem and neutralize the aforementioned restrictions to a maximum (Creswell 2012).

In the future, it would be reasonable to test the established analytical framework for the research of local election campaigns in different countries. With this we would get answers on questions about actual relationships, connections, and meaning of individual dimensions of a local election campaign. Consequently, this would also enable the development of a typology of local election campaigns. Empirical research could depict the characteristics of local election campaigns in the countries under consideration. A wider insight into local election campaigns would surely be achieved with an internationally comparative study that would, in the first phase, demand a research of context of the included countries and, later, test the analytical framework through the empirical part.

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BOOK REVIEW: SIZE AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY

Miro HAČEK and Simona KUKOVIČ


How large should local governments be? This is the first sentence in the introduction (p.3) to the Size and local democracy book by five well-established experts in local government studies. But it is also the pivotal question that has exercised minds of scholars and experts from old ages to the present. Many countries have implemented local government reforms in last few decades trying to find best answer to this basic question, resulting in more or less substantial changes in the population size of local government units; either in the direction of small units of only few hundreds inhabitants or large behemoths of several tens or even hundreds of thousands inhabitants. Territorial reform has the nasty habit of being the most important aspect of any local government reform process, and is typically accompanied by heated debates about the effectiveness, desirability and rationality of small- versus large-scale local government units. Such debates are by no means recent occurrence, but definite answer to the basic question is still very eluding one.

Recent political debates about the merits of the amalgamation reforms and the academic debate about the questions “is small really so beautiful” and “is big really so ugly” and deriving point of the most recent comprehensive study by group of five scholars, all senior researchers of local government reform and devolution processes. Determining the optimum size of local government units is complicating process that generates need for large amount of empirical

1 Prof. Miro HAČEK, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Assist. prof. Simona KUKOVIČ, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
evidence regarding the actual effects of size on relevant aspects of democratic governance. Authors set central question “what is the effect of size on the democratic quality of municipal government?” As size has many possible dimensions (population, geography, density, etc.), authors concentrate on population size, seeking the answer to the research question on the basis of empirical analyses of conditions existing in 234 municipalities found in four countries – Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and Netherlands. Authors begin their analysis with the precise definition of the aspects of democratic government trying to clarify how these aspects may be related to size. In the introductory chapter authors are distinguishing between two fundamentally different positions in the debate. On the one side there is the Lovely Lilliput camp of scholars, who hold the view that increasing the size of political units is likely to have essentially negative effects on the democratic quality of local political life. On the opposite side authors recognize Beautiful Brobdingnag adherents, who claim, that increasing system size is likely to have benign effects. Different as there position may be, both camps agree that size really does matter and changes in the population size are thought to have major impact on the democratic quality of governments. There is also the third, quieter camp that claims that size does not matter on the democratic quality in local governments.

More than thirty years ago, Ken Newton in his well know essay in Political Studies journal already concluded that “local authorities of different sizes, whether rural or urban, do not differ by more than small amount, if they differ at all, on many measures of functional effectiveness and democracy”. He even claims that size is irrelevant to many aspects of functional effectiveness and democracy. Thirty years later and armed with large amount of collected empirical data from four included cases of local governments, Denters et al. come to the similar conclusions to those formulated by Newton, but with a number of important differences. Most importantly, Denters et co found significant population size effects in more than just a few instances; although size effects found were of small magnitude, they are not making normative claims in terms of relevance or irrelevance of these effects. Denters et co come to opposite conclusion from Newton’s, as they prove that large units may have several disadvantages when it comes to organized participation in politics. It is clear, however, that local government in most European countries have been subject to a variety of forces, which may have reduced the relevance, and impact of population size. For one thing, public policies in many countries have been oriented to ensure that municipalities of all possible sizes have economic resources needed to provide ever-extensive array of public services and facilities.

Denters and co-authors should really be congratulated to tackle with one of the oldest and most neglected questions in modern local politics, i.e. how large should local units be? They are not trying to force simple answer to the simple question, knowing that there is a thin line in complexity of the issue and proving that – contrary to the Beautiful Brobdingnag camp beliefs – small can be a bit more beautiful after all.
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