

RELIGIOSITY AND CONSPIRACY BELIEFS: PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIPS

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Despite cognitive similarities, the relationship between religiosity and conspiracy beliefs remains ambiguous due to their heterogeneity and variation in cultural contexts. The Polish study addresses these discrepancies by using complementary measures, including the strength of faith, religious beliefs, experiences, and practices. Conspiracy theory beliefs were assessed using a generic measure and four specific theories on vaccination, the Ukrainian war, COVID-19, and 5G networks. An online survey was conducted, collecting 898 responses from conspiracy theory believers to explore the relationship. The results show that for generic conspiracist beliefs religious experience and religious beliefs emerge as positive determinants, while religious practices emerge as a negative determinant. For specific conspiracy theories on vaccination, the Ukrainian war, and 5G technology, the positive correlation occurs with the strength of faith and religious experience. None of the religious factors are statistically significant for COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. The research findings highlight the need for more in-depth and comparative studies.

Key words: religiosity; conspiracy beliefs; conspiracy theories; conspiracy mentality.

1 BACKGROUND

The links between religiosity and believing in conspiracy theories seem obvious. They share a similar simplistic view of looking at the world, a belief that certain events are caused by invisible forces, determinism, and a lack of individual responsibility due to the sense of lack of influence and agency. They are supposed to satisfy similar psychological needs and rely on similar thinking patterns. However, unambiguous answers about their relationship are scarce (Frenken, Bilewicz and Imhoff 2023). The divergence observed in the research may be due to the cultural embeddedness of religiosity, but also to differences in research

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approaches. Researchers rarely take into account the inherent heterogeneity of concepts (Franks, Bangerter and Bauer 2013), which may affect the prevalent patterns of association between the two phenomena. The dominant research on conspiracy thinking has treated religiosity as only one or two of its various spiritual and secular manifestations (Kim and Kim 2021; Leibovitz et al. 2021). The purpose of this study is to examine the predictive role of religiosity for conspiratorial beliefs, considering their multifaceted significance.

The presented research was conducted in Poland, a state with a population of 37.7 million and over 187 registered religious denominations in 2021 (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2022). The Roman Catholic Church holds the dominant position with 32.19 million registered members (*ibid.*). However, due to various factors, it is undergoing a process of secularisation, marked by a decline in the number of believers, which has fallen by 1.51 million since 2011 (Pew Research Centre 2018; Pilch, Turska-Kawa and Galica 2023; Boguszewski, Makowska and Podkowińska 2022).

Catholicism has a strong and deep-rooted presence in Poland, dating back to the adoption of Christianity in the 10th century. The involvement of the Catholic Church at key moments in Polish history shaped a special relationship between the sacred and the profane in public life. Despite political persecution, the Church's position in society was further strengthened during the communist regimes. This had consequences for the emerging post-Soviet system in Poland in the 1990s (Koller 2021), when the Church became a partner and an agent of change, sitting at the Democratic Round Table, securing Christian values within the young Polish democracy, and thus continuing its political mission. Thus, in Poland, the institutional role of the Church, the cultural embedding of religion, as well as its ludic nature, create a specific and unique national context of analysis (Pilch, Turska-Kawa and Galica 2023). As a result, the social behaviour of Polish Catholics may be mediated more by institutional trust in the Catholic Church rather than by faith or biblical teachings.

2 CONSPIRACY BELIEFS AND RELIGIOSITY

From a cognitive perspective, researchers see some similarities between religiosity and belief in conspiracy theories, which share a way of looking at the world and interpreting events. Researchers see a similarity between an all-powerful being (as described in many religions) and a hidden power that organises events or hides the truth (Pilch, Turska-Kawa and Galica 2023; Matuszewski, Rams-Ługowski and Pawłowski 2024). It is also important to highlight the tendency to detect agency, communication rituals, or the minimally counterintuitive nature of both religious and conspiracist beliefs (Franks, Bangerter and Bauer 2013). Religion is based on values that become an integral part of an individual's daily activities while at the same time shaping their attitudes towards the outside world. Bezalel (2021) argues that the nature of religious beliefs is important for understanding the epistemological underpinnings of worldviews that support conspiracy theories amid what might be called conspiratorial ambiguity. Drawing on the cognitive science of religion, Franks et al (2013) argue that conspiracy theories are quasi-religious representations because their content, forms and functions correspond to those found in the beliefs of institutionalised religions. However, conspiracy theories are quasi-religious in the sense that conspiracy theories and the communities

that support them do not share many of the institutional characteristics of organised religions.

Based on the similarities identified, researchers have argued that religiosity is associated with greater conspiracy beliefs (Kim and Kim 2021; Leibovitz et al. 2021; Dyrendal and Hestad 2021). In German study, Hillenbrand and Pollack (2023) found that belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories was positively correlated with an image of a punishing God, exclusivist beliefs, and private prayer. A study conducted among Polish Roman Catholics (Łowicki et al. 2022) showed that religious fundamentalism is positively associated with coronavirus conspiracy beliefs. In other research alternative religious beliefs, measured by belief in reincarnation, are positively associated with belief in the Big Pharma conspiracy theory (Ladini 2022). However, this relationship is not a consistent finding in the research. Other studies either found no significant association (Agle and Xiao 2021; Furnham 2021; Teličák and Halama 2021), or the association varied across different conspiracy belief scales (Atari, Afhami and Swami 2019).

The study by Jasinskaja-Lahti and Jetten (2019) underlines the importance of distinguishing between religiosity as a self-categorisation and religiosity as a worldview. The authors find that it is not the self-categorisation as religious, but the extent to which religious worldviews are endorsed that can predict people's belief in conspiracy theories. In turn, research conducted in Germany, Poland, and the United States (Frenken, Bilewicz and Imhoff 2023) shows that the correlations between religiosity and a more needs-based conspiracy mentality differed between these countries. The authors demonstrate that similarities in explanatory style and ideology appear to be central to the relationship between intrinsic religiosity and conspiracy theories endorsement, but that psychological needs play only a minor role.

Religiosity is difficult to conceptualise and operationalise. Researchers present different approaches, considering religiosity, for example, in terms of religious commitment (Agle and Xiao 2021), religious belief (Freeman et al. 2022), or the importance of religion (Tonković et al. 2021). The nature of religiosity, as traditionally understood, is institutional, but today, more and more people have unorganised spiritual beliefs (Baker and Draper 2010; Yilmaz 2021). Researchers outline the relationships between religiosity and spirituality differently in their studies of conspiracy beliefs (Kosarkova et al. 2021; Gligorić et al. 2021; Leibovitz et al. 2021). Czech (2022) demonstrates that individual spirituality (the centrality of religiosity and the quest orientation of religiosity) is less important for conspiracy thinking than religion understood as a specific element of ideology (e.g. Catholic nationalism or collective narcissism).

Similar difficulties, although to a much lesser, extent, arise in the analysis of conspiracy beliefs. On the one hand, researchers undertake analyses using categories of general conspiratorial functioning, such as a Manichaeian worldview, a belief in invisible forces, fatalism (Carey 2019), a belief in an unjust (Furnham 2021) or dangerous world (Hart and Graether 2018). They represent a particular way of looking at the world and explaining the events taking place in it. These general constructs of conspiratorial functioning represent universal predispositions that are not determined by socio-political or cultural contexts. Among them, conspiracy mentality, also referred to as "conspiracy ideation", is an important construct (Wardawy-Dudziak 2024; Douglas et al. 2019). Conspiracy mentality describes the general, fundamental tendency to believe in

conspiracies, creating a monological belief system (Imhoff, Bertlich and Frenken 2022). It predicts belief in specific conspiracy theories – even contradictory ones (Wood et al., 2012) or fictitious ones (Swami et al. 2011). In recent years, the belief in conspiracy theories related to climate change (Bertin et al. 2021; Freeman et al. 2022; Hornsey, Harris and Fielding 2018), the COVID-19 pandemic (van Mulukom et al. 2022; Pilch et al. 2023) or military action in Ukraine (Ortmann 2022; Yablokov 2022; Turska-Kawa and Stępień-Lampa 2023; Gentile and Kragh 2022) has been particularly prominent in the literature. Despite the apparent links between conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy theories, it is difficult to transfer links with religiosity from one construct to the other. Conspiracy mentality is less content-laden and more associated with a particular general cognitive approach. In contrast, specific conspiracy theories are more susceptible to other situational or elite cues, for example, from religious and political leaders (Frenken, Bilewicz and Imhoff 2023), as well as geopolitical and historical circumstances (Šteger 2024).

3 STUDY DESIGN

3.1 Research Model

Based on the discrepancies and interpretive difficulties observed in the literature on the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and religiosity, complementary measures were used to allow an in-depth analysis of the constructs. Religiosity was examined through the perspective of strength of faith, religious beliefs, religious experience, and religious practices. In contrast, conspiracy beliefs were examined using a general measure to diagnose the level of conspiracy ideation, as well as specific theories (vaccination, war in Ukraine, COVID pandemic, 5G technology). Breaking down the variables and treating them from separate theoretical perspectives allows us to diagnose the relationship between them and the strength of the connections. Two main research questions were posed at the outset of the research investigation: (1) Are there relationships between religiosity and conspiracy theories? (2) What is the predictive value of religious variables for variables describing conspiracy beliefs? In response to the first general research question, which expressed the search for links between religiosity and conspiracy theories, the following hypotheses were dissected:

H1: There is a relationship between general conspiracy beliefs and religiosity.

It is difficult to predict the direction of this relationship. Positive relationships may indicate an overlap in the functioning of cognitive schemas in the case of conspiracy beliefs and religiosity. In contrast, a negative correlation between general conspiracy thinking and religiosity suggests that the needs satisfied by religiosity or conspiracy beliefs are mutually exclusive and offer competing explanations of events.

H2: There is a relationship between belief in specific conspiracy theories and religiosity.

A positive relationship may indicate a cognitive proximity of explaining certain events through religiosity and conspiratorial thinking. A negative link between specific theories and religiosity may indicate the prevalence of a competing way of explaining specific events.

H3: There is a relationship between the intensity of religious practices and faith in conspiracy theories. Religious practices were treated separately in the study.

The negative relationship between the variables may be the result of contact with religious authorities, which discourages adherence to unofficial narratives (Koller 2022). The situation in Poland rather shows the proximity of political and religious authorities. Church authorities are in the habit of making public statements on political issues (Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2020), politicians, if ideologically coherent, like to present themselves as religious practitioners, accompanied by the hierarchs of the Catholic Church. Finally, state ceremonies are often combined with religious services. Concluding, one might think that contact with religious authorities may discourage adherence to unofficial narratives.

3.2 Sample

The research was conducted using an online survey questionnaire. It was posted on social profiles and FB fan pages that promote conspiracy content and bring together supporters of conspiracy thinking. Respondents received the research information sheet, which included information about the research objectives of the study, the institution responsible for the project, and the guarantee of anonymity of the data collected. In the introduction, the respondents were assured that their opinions would be respected. It was emphasised that the survey was aimed at people who were interested in current political events, the global political situation, determinants of public decision-making processes, as well as those who do not accept the official government explanations on public issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the vaccination system, and 5G networks. Despite this, the research was repeatedly removed from FB pages and the people who posted it were temporarily banned from access. The research was conducted between 20 January 2023 and 30 May 2023. There were 898 participants, including 711 women (79.2%) and 187 men (20.8%). The vast majority were under the age of 34 (90.4%) and unmarried (85.3%). More than half of the respondents declared tertiary education, including postgraduate degrees (57.0%), and slightly fewer reported secondary education with a baccalaureate (40.8%). The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Silesia (No. KEUS303/11.2022).

3.3 Research Variables and Tools

Conspiracy beliefs. The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale/GCBS (Brotherton, French and Pickering 2013; Rob Brotherton 2015) in the Polish adaptation by Siwiak et al. (2019) was used to explore conspiracy mentality. The scale examines the general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories without referring to a specific theory, which allows for research at any historical moment and eliminates the effect of cultural differences. The reliability of the scale as measured by Cronbach's alpha was 0.92.

Belief in particular conspiracy theories. Four 3-item scales were introduced to diagnose belief in specific conspiracy theories: (1) the SARS-CoV-2 virus pandemic (e.g., COVID-19 morbidity and mortality statistics are deliberately fabricated); (2) 5G networks (e.g., the evidence of the dangerous effects of 5G radiation is being hidden from the public); (3) vaccines (e.g., vaccines are harmful and this fact is hidden from the people); (4) Russian aggression on Ukrainian territory (e.g., the war in Ukraine is necessary to remove the Nazi government

there). The reliability of the scales as measured by Cronbach's alpha was 0.87, 0.82, 0.87, 0.83 respectively.

Strength of religious faith. The study used the Brief Version of the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith (Plante et al. 2002). The scale consists of five statements: (1) I pray daily; (2) I look to my faith as providing meaning and purpose in my life; (3) I consider myself active in my faith or church; (4) I enjoy being around others who share my faith; (5) My faith impacts many of my decisions, to which the respondents are asked to respond on a 4-point scale, where 1 means strongly disagree, and 4 – strongly agree. The reliability of the scale as measured by Cronbach's alpha was 0.93.

Religious beliefs and religious experience. In the study, we used two scales derived from the Centrality of Religiosity Scale (Huber 1996; Huber 2003) in a Polish adaptation (Zarzycka 2007). The first scale diagnoses subjective assessments of the probability of the existence of a transcendent reality, using the following questions: (1) To what extent are you convinced that God exists? (2) How strong is your belief in the existence of life after death? (3) How strong is your belief in the existence of a Supreme Being? The reliability of the scale as measured by Cronbach's alpha was 0.92. The second scale measures the intensity of an individual's experience of a transcendent reality. It is measured by the following questions: (1) How often do you experience situations in which you have the sense that God wants to tell you something? (2) How often do you experience situations in which God intervenes in your life? (3) How often do you experience the presence of God? The reliability of the scale as measured by Cronbach's alpha was 0.95. For each scale, the respondents were given a 5-point response scale, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 5 means "strongly agree".

Religious practices. The question on religious practices complemented the question on religiosity, understood as participation in religious services (including via radio, television, or the internet). When asked about the frequency of such activities, the respondents were given the following answers: never, once to several times a year, one to three times a month, once a week, more than once a week, difficult to say, don't want to answer.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Preliminary Analysis

The means and standard deviations of the variables used are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1: THE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY

	Mean	SD
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale/GCBS	3.001	0.812
Vaccine conspiracy beliefs	2.539	1.097
Ukraine war conspiracy beliefs	2.072	0.943
5G Networks conspiracy beliefs	2.178	1.111
Pandemic conspiracy beliefs	2.861	1.203
Strength of faith	1.974	0.890
Religious beliefs	2.390	1.782
Religious experience	1.433	1.564
Religious practices	2.083	1.170

Correlations between religious and conspiracy variables participants are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND CONSPIRACY VARIABLES PARTICIPANTS

	Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale/GCBS	Vaccine conspiracy beliefs	Ukraine war conspiracy beliefs	5G networks conspiracy beliefs	Pandemic conspiracy beliefs
Strength of faith	0.235**	0.271**	0.273**	0.317**	0.246**
Religious beliefs	0.255**	0.202**	0.165**	0.211**	0.246**
Religious experience	0.268**	0.267**	0.258**	0.295**	0.272**
Religious practices	0.118**	0.176**	0.213**	0.244**	0.188**

** p<.01 (two-tailed)

4.2 Religiosity as a Predictor of Conspiracy Beliefs

To verify the predictive power of the religious variables for conspiracy beliefs, a series of regression analyses separate for the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale/GCBS (model 1) and each of the specific conspiracy theories (models 2, 3, 4, 5) was used. In each model, the strength of faith, religious beliefs, religious experience, and religious practices were entered as independent variables.

In the first model, based on coefficient analysis, religious beliefs (beta = 0.158; p = 0.003), religious experience (beta = 0.202; p <0.001) and religious practices (beta = -0.097; p=0.014) were found to be significant predictors of overall conspiratorial beliefs as measured by the GCBS. Religious experience and religious beliefs strengthen conspiracist beliefs, whereas religious practices weaken them. The proposed model was found to fit the data well $F(3,843) = 27.074$; $p < 0.001$ and explained 8.5% of the variance in the dependent variable.

In the second model, the analysis showed the significance of strength of faith (beta = 0.156; p = 0.02) and religious experience (beta = 0.129; p=0.011) for belief in vaccine theories. At higher levels of the predictor variables, we observed a higher intensity of belief in conspiracy theories about vaccines. The proposed model was found to fit the data well, with $F(2,895) = 34.755$; $p < 0.001$ and explained 7.0% of the variance in the dependent variable.

In the third model, the strength of faith (beta = 0.220; p <0.001), religious beliefs (beta = -0.150; p=0.004), and religious experience (beta = 0.198; p<0.001) were found to be predictors of belief in conspiracy theories about the war in Ukraine. The proposed model was found to fit the data well $F(3,894) = 27.670$; $p < 0.001$ and explained 10.2% of the variance in the dependent variable.

In the fourth model, analyses showed similar relationships – the strength of faith (beta = 0.209; p <0.001) and religious experience (beta = 0.118; p=0.019) were found to be significant predictors of conspiracy beliefs about the 5G network. The proposed model was found to fit the data well $F(2,895) = 47.301$; $p < 0.001$ and explained 9.4% of the variance in the dependent variable.

In the fifth model, none of the religious predictors proved to be significant for belief in conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic.

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The study aimed to verify the predictive power of religiosity for conspiracy beliefs. To avoid oversimplifying the concept of religiosity and reducing it to a merely institutional or spiritual phenomenon, we proposed conceptualisation and operationalisation of the phenomenon, which included the following variables: strength of faith, religious belief, religious experience, and religious practice. We approached the phenomenon of conspiracy beliefs also in the complex way. We focused on the generic concept of conspiracist beliefs and specific conspiracy theories, distinguishing between four theories related to vaccination, 5G networks, COVID-19, and the war in Ukraine.

During the research process, three hypotheses were formulated concerning the relationships between religious variables and conspiracy beliefs. The first two hypotheses concerned the relationships between religiosity and generic and specific conspiracy beliefs. Religious experience and religious beliefs were found to be positive predictors of the generic conspiracist beliefs. In turn, in the case of belief in three specific conspiracy theories - the vaccine, the Ukrainian war and 5G networks - similar patterns were diagnosed for the strength of faith and religious experience, which were recognised as positive predictors. In the case of the Ukrainian war religious beliefs were found to be a negative predictor.

Religious experience emerged as the strongest predictor, consistently positive in each of the models. Religious experience is responsive and dialogic in nature, as opposed to being solely cognitive (Argyle 2005). It is characterised by inexpressibility and impermanence, while simultaneously emphasising its emotional element (Głaz 2021). This dimension encapsulates transcendence as an active reality directed towards an inner world of the individual. The more religious experiences one has, the more stable it becomes (Zarzycka 2007). This finding intriguingly aligns with the reflection on the relationships between religious beliefs and beliefs in paranormal and supernatural phenomena in the context of individual differences in cognitive style. Yilmaz (2021) argues that, on average, non-believers tend to be more open, reflective, and less likely to endorse epistemically doubtful beliefs (e.g., conspiracy theories) than those who believe in supernatural events or paranormal experiences, such as astrology or magic. Furthermore, increased religiosity implies a self-imposed immaturity (Kant 1999) and a deterministic and uncritical approach, as Grabow and Rock (2023) indicate: "Insofar as responsibility for events and outcomes is shifted to a supernatural agent; explanations by (religious) authorities are not challenged but tend to be unquestioningly accepted". The researchers argue that conspiracy narratives and religious doctrines may contradict each other on specific issues, but this does not diminish their positive associations (ibid.). The strength of the non-cognitive predictor, religious experience, supports this conclusion. It seems that logic does not prevent their emotional interaction.

As previously mentioned, religious experience is one of the five dimensions of the Centrality of Religiosity scale. In the study by Łowicki et al. (2022), where the scale was used as a single dimension, the indicator of religiosity centrality was either unrelated to or revealed a negative relationship with coronavirus conspiracy beliefs. This may call for a more in-depth analysis of the individual dimensions of religiosity, as their distinct significance for conspiracy beliefs may offset each other.

None of the religious predictors were statistically significant in relation to COVID-19 pandemic beliefs. The finding mirrors the results of the US study conducted by Agle and Xiao (2021), where religious commitment showed a marginal and typically non-significant association with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. However, another US study by Rogers and Powe (2022) and a UK study by Freeman et al. (2022) argue that coronavirus conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with higher levels of religiosity. Rogers and Powe (2022) emphasise that this association was more pronounced on the early stages of the pandemic, while Leibovitz et al. (2021, 5) add that "longer-term follow-up might reveal a decreasing trend for conspiracy beliefs". This trend was also observed in an earlier study by Freeman and Bentall (2017). The disparities between the results of our study and the latter may be explained by variations in the cultural and religious context or the phase of the pandemic, during which the studies were conducted.

The third hypothesis explored the relationship between engagement in religious practices and conspiracy beliefs. In presented models, religious involvement seems to be overshadowed by other variables. An exception was observed in the generic beliefs model, where religious practices emerged as a significant negative predictor, aligning with our expectations. Similar results were found in a German study by Hillenbrand and Pollack (2023) and US study by Freeman and Bentall (2017). In contrast, Boguszewski et al. (2022) argue that in the Polish context, increased religiosity commitment during COVID-19 was positively correlated with beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, including the sources and causes of the pandemic. Religiosity, defined as ritual practices of a collective and individual nature, was also correlated with having less scientific knowledge and facts related to the coronavirus widespread (ibid.). The argument made by Olagoke et al. (2021) shows that informal knowledge collected and disseminated by church leaders may contradict scientific data and allow for more conspiratorial thinking. Therefore, the role of the church leaders in relation to generic and specific conspiracy beliefs should be further explored, especially in those countries characterised by high attendance at religious services.

The findings of the study are a catalyst for further research on this issue. The purposeful sampling strategy played a crucial role in effectively addressing the research questions. The primary criterion was the potential prevalence of conspiracy beliefs; as a result, the survey was distributed through social media profiles and Facebook fan pages that promote conspiracy content and attract conspiracy beliefs enthusiasts. Most of the respondents (90.4%) were under the age of 34 and had a relatively high level of education. This raises the important question of what knowledge, and skills citizens should acquire, and when, to be able to recognise and critically evaluate conspiracy theories. In the realm of mass information, the ability to assess the reliability of information and the trustworthiness of its sources is indispensable. This is a pathway to an informed society and a safeguard against the pitfalls of disinformation and the manipulation of public opinion. It also underlines the role of academia, including pedagogy, as well as research, in their mission to collaborate with and contribute to society. This also raises the question of what practices and assessment tools should be developed to enhance an informed society that can identify and debunk conspiracy theories in everyday life. Finally, further research efforts should focus on gender issues, as most of the respondents were women, almost 80% of whom were young, unmarried, and highly educated. This raises questions about their status in Poland and the motivation for their involvement in the aforementioned groups.

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RELIGIOZNOST IN PREPRIČANJA V TEORIJE ZAROT: VZORCI ODNOSOV

Kljub kognitivnim podobnostim odnos med religioznostjo in zarotniškimi prepričanji ostaja dvoumen zaradi heterogenosti teorij zarot in variacije v kulturnih kontekstih. Poljska študija obravnava ta neskladja z uporabo dopolnjujočih se ukrepov, vključno z močjo vere, verskimi prepričanji, izkušnjami in praksami. Prepričanja o teorijah zarot so bila ocenjena z uporabo splošnega merila in štirih posebnih teorij o cepljenju, ukrajinski vojni, covid-19 in omrežjih 5G. Izvedena je bila spletna anketa, ki je zbrala 898 odgovorov pripadnikov teorije zarot. Rezultati kažejo, da se za generična zarotniška prepričanja verske izkušnje in prepričanja pojavljajo kot pozitivne determinante, medtem ko se verske prakse pojavljajo kot negativna determinanta. Pri specifičnih teorijah zarot o cepljenju, ukrajinski vojni in omrežjih 5G se pozitivna povezava pojavi z močjo vere in verskimi izkušnjami. Noben od verskih dejavnikov ni statistično pomemben za prepričanja o teorijah zarot o covid-19. Izsledki raziskave poudarjajo potrebo po bolj poglobljenih in primerjalnih študijah.

Ključne besede: religioznost; teorije zarot; mentaliteta zarot; prepričanja.